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To every individual who, in a world that has lost its direction and refuses to pay
attention, has hope still. May your truth be heard loud enough. May you find justice at
last.
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1. Introduction:
The TRC and the Media’s Effect on
Contemporary Race Relations in
South Africa

8

H

istory lives on in South Africa. The claim that almost every issue
in the country can be traced back to its history of apartheid

remains overwhelmingly true. To this day, the divisive legacy of that system of
racial segregation continues to impact the lives of South Africans in many ways.
For instance, alongside Brazil, South Africa has the most unequal income
distribution in the world.1 The large degree of economic disparity has in turn
been identified as the source of various social maladies, such as high levels of
criminal violence in the country.2 Moreover, the violence that characterized
apartheid did not necessarily diminish with the official end of the regime. It has
taken on new forms in the post-apartheid era and continues to be a daily
feature in South Africa, a phenomenon which has been cast as the product of a
―culture of violence.‖3 Although data provided by the Minister of Police Nathi
Mthethwar point to falling rates of crime in 2010, the country is still perceived
as among the most violent in the world.4 Within this context, race has been at
the center of widespread debate.
Race remains a contentious topic among South Africans. It is the most
salient element in the lives of millions in the country for a number of reasons.
Economic inequality, for instance, is highly racialized. According to figures
from the United Nations Development Program, ―the standard of living of
1

Villa-Vicencio & Ngesi. “South Africa: Beyond the Miracle”, in Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio,
eds. Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa. Cape
Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2003. Pg. 278
2
Bruce, David. “To be someone: Status insecurity and violence in South Africa”, in Patrick Burton, ed.
Someone Stole my Smile: an Exploration into the Causes of Youth Violence in South Africa. Cape Town:
Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention, November 2007. Pg. 57
3
Shaw, Mark. “Confronting the Violent Society” Crime and Policing in Post-apartheid South Africa,
Chapter 3. Pg. 53
4
“Crime Stats: Murders fall by 8,6%” Mail&Guardian, September 9, 2010. Accessed in September, 2010
at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-09-09-crime-stats-murders-fall-by-86
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average Black South Africans is comparable to the 124th most wealthy nation in
the world (after Congo), whereas for the average white South African it is
comparable to the 24th (after Spain).‖5 Violence also affects the population along
racial lines. Wealthy South Africans are twice as likely as the poor to be victims
of property-related crime, and yet the likelihood of dying in these incidents is
80 times more likely for poor South Africans, who are overwhelmingly nonwhite.6 Yet, there appears to be an aversion to labeling many everyday acts of
prejudice as racially-based due to a ―social silence about racism.‖7 Nevertheless,
this apparent unwillingness to openly talk about the impact of race in society is
counterbalanced by the media‘s portrayal of it.
Every so often, news stories with a strong racial undercurrent bring to
light the still unresolved issues of race that characterize post-apartheid South
Africa. A study undertaken by the Media Monitoring Group suggests an
increase in the frequency of the media‘s attention to racially - based incidents in
the post-1999 period.8 High-profile cases like the April 2010 assassination of
Eugene Terre‘blanche - one of the most vocal defenders of apartheid and
founder

of

the

far-right

Afrikaner

resistance

movement

Afrikaner

Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) - at the hands of two of his black workers,
instigated a renewed discussion on the role of race as a predictor of violence in
5

UNDP data, as quoted in Hamber, Brandon, “Have no Doubt, it is Fear in the Land: An Exploration of
the Continuing Cycles of Violence in South Africa”, Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie, 1999.Pg. 117
6
Steinberg, 1999 quoted in Hamber, Brandon, “Have no Doubt, it is Fear in the Land: An Exploration of
the Continuing Cycles of Violence in South Africa”, Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie, 1999. Pg. 117
7
Harris, Bronwyn. “Spaces of Violence, Places of Fear: Urban Conflict in Post-Apartheid South
Africa.”Paper presented on the Conflicts and Urban Social Violence panel in Colombia. Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Web. http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/urbansafety/englishspaces.pdf
8
Media Monitoring Group, “Shares of Prejudice: An investigation into the South African media’s
coverage of racial violence and xenophobia.” Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Web.
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/foreigners/shades.pdf (hereinafter MMP).
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South Africa. Likewise, the Reitz Four incident at Free State University in
February of 2008, in which four white students were shown humiliating five
black workers in a notorious internet video, brought to the surface another
national debate about ongoing racial prejudice. Although only a few explicitly
racial events receive wide coverage by the media, they serve as the symbolic
representations of the small scale incidents that take place on a daily basis,
thereby disclosing the sentiments of many South Africans in regards to race.
These recent race-related incidents lead one to re-examine South Africa‘s
engagement in a process of reconciliation with the end of white-minority rule.
More than a decade after the fall of the repressive regime, racially-charged
events like those just previously outlined reflect a rather fragmented picture of
the ‗rainbow nation‘. These events beg the fundamental question of whether or
not South Africans have been able to depart from the racial foundation that
defined their relations in the past, and if not, why not. These events cast the
spotlight on the transitional justice process, and whether it in any way relates to
how race continues to impact society today.
This thesis will assess the state of race relations in South African society,
fifteen years after the end of apartheid. It will analyze the current racial context
in relation to the reconciliation process that the country undertook in the
aftermath of that system of racial segregation. The preliminary hypothesis that
motivates this research is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
directed by the Parliamentary Act that established it, failed to properly
integrate a discussion of race and racism into its work. Particularly, that the
11

conflict came to be understood in terms of victims of a small scope of human
rights violations and perpetrators of those violations posed certain limitations
on reconciliation. In the same manner, the way in which the media reported the
TRC process only added to a lack of structural analysis about apartheid.
Although extensive, the media limited its work to covering the TRC hearings
without subjecting the content of the information they gathered to deeper
criticism. Hence, by ignoring the context of the events described and discussed
in the Commission, the media deepened the analysis gap of the transitional
justice process. Ultimately, the TRC and the media‘s downplay of race as the
explanatory variable for the violations that occurred during apartheid may have
contributed to race relations that remain problematic in contemporary South
Africa.
On the one hand, apartheid was, by all means and most essentially, a
system of racial segregation. On the other hand, the Commission strove to take
a higher stance by ―casting the net of blame‖ on all sides. 9 In this context, the
language that guided the work of the Commission is relevant, since it may have
downplayed or dismissed the ‗race factor‘.10 Similarly, the media, a key player
in the dissemination of the TRC‘s work, reflected this stance through the
framing of the information it delivered to the audience that followed the
process. Hence, the sidestepping of race in the TRC and the media may have
represented a missed opportunity to understand the framework that led to the
9

Gibson, James. “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, (2006) 603:82. Pg. 103
10
Fullard,Madeleine, “Displacing Race: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
Interpretations of Violence”, Race and Citizenship in Transition Series. Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation. Pg. vii (hereinafter Fullard)

12

establishment of and maintained apartheid in place for more than forty years.
The subject of this thesis is the ongoing consequences of this missed
opportunity.
With the demise of white-minority rule, the question of how to reconcile
South Africans was pressing. The human rights violations of that regime had to
be dealt with to set the foundations for a more peaceful environment in the
future. Leaders rejected the immediate option of trials and decided to opt for
the establishment of a truth commission, an increasingly common transitional
justice mechanism. Transitional justice is defined as ―the attempts of new
governments in regimes that have recently undergone a transition to
democracy to establish a process to hold members of the former regime and
those against it accountable for gross violations of human rights that occurred
during their tenure.‖11 Truth commissions have been established in countries
around the world in the hope of preventing future violence.12 Arguably, the
most famous truth commission has been the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
The TRC was the foundation of the transitional justice process of postapartheid South Africa. In 1995, the South African Parliament passed the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34, which established
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).13 According to the TRC

11

Borer, Tristan,“Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity.” Tristan Borer, ed. Telling the Truths: Truth
Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.
Pg.17
12
Hayner, Priscilla. “The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity”, Vol. 3. Macmillan
Reference USA, 2004. Pg. 1045-1047
13
Borer, Tristan,“Truth, Reconciliation and Justice”, Peace Review (1999) 11:2. Pg. 306
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Report, the Act dictated that the major objectives of the Commission would be
to promote ―national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.‖14 The Act established that
these objectives-national unity and reconciliation- should be accomplished by:
 Establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature
and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were
committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off
date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context
of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and
the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the
commission of the violations, by conducting investigations and
holding hearings.
 Facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a
political objective and comply with the requirements of this Act;
 Establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of
victims and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such
victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own
accounts of the violations of which they are the victims, and by
recommending reparation measures in respect of them;
 Compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as
possible of the activities and findings of the Commission […] and
which contains recommendations of measures to prevent the
future violations of human rights.15
Thus, the TRC had several goals, one of which was to restore the dignity of
victims by acknowledging their stories. In terms of perpetrators, the
Commission was in charge of providing amnesty to them in exchange for the
14

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1, Final Report, 55 (hereinafter TRC Final Report 1).
TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55.
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full disclosure of the truth about the acts they committed. According to the Act,
actions that could constitute gross violations of human rights included killing,
abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment.16 This definition, among other
concepts that the Commission had to interpret, has been subject to criticism by
several scholars.
The fact that human rights violations were narrowed down to specific
acts has been criticized and deemed as a factor that limited the TRC‘s capacity
to address structural issues. Tristan Borer notes this critique of the definitions of
gross violations of human rights, which emphasizes how bodily-integrity rights
could ignore the relevance of the violation of socio-economic rights:
―The decision of the Commission to concentrate only on violations
committed as specific acts…meant that victims of forced removals or of
Bantu education or any other of a myriad of laws passed by the
apartheid government, or of the effects of those laws including hunger,
poverty, and the lack of basic health care would not be deemed victims
according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.‖17
Some scholars hold the view that a structural analysis of how the system of
apartheid itself affected the fabric of society was overlooked in the process of
the TRC. Kader Asmal and Mahmood Mamdani suggest that this narrow focus
on violations of bodily-integrity rights ―ignored the implicit wider mandate of
the Act‖, which according to them, ―…included the wider structural violations
of apartheid based upon racial discrimination.‖18 Other scholars, however, have
identified that the very Act dismisses specific references to apartheid, race or
16

“Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995” Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Web.
17

Borer, Tristan. “A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconciliation in South
Africa”, Human Rights Quarterly 25, 2005. Pg. 1092 (hereinafter Borer, “A Taxonomy of Victims and
Perpetrators”).
18
Fullard, 2.
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racism, and that these omissions had a clear impact on the work of the TRC.19
Similarly, the lack of a concrete understanding of what reconciliation should
entail has added to the ongoing debate.
The TRC was given the task of laying the groundwork for reconciliation
without a clear definition of what was meant by this objective. Borer shows
how the very mandate that established the Commission did nothing more than
spell out the tasks that ought to lead to reconciliation, without really grappling
with the full meaning of this fundamental concept.20 Similarly, Hamber states,
―Reconciliation as an objective proved problematic. During the lifetime of the
Commission, the term was never defined nor was a shared understanding
ascertained.‖21 As a result, people could easily hold expectations that did not
match up to the real delivery-capacity of the TRC, or have competing ideas of
what a ‗reconciled‘ South African should look like.22 Although at least one
research study presents an improved picture of social relations in South
Africa,23 the 2010 South African Reconciliation Barometer offered a rather
negative perception of the status of reconciliation in the country. In fact, the
Barometer identifies that racial relations, among other dimensions of
reconciliation, presents the greatest challenges.24 The lack of conceptual clarity
has had continuing effects, since the question of who should have reconciled
19

Fullard, 29.
Borer,Tristan, “Reconciling South Africa or South Africans: Cautionary Notes from the TRC”, African
Studies Quarterly, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2004. Pg. 23. (hereinafter Borer, “Cautionary Notes from the TRC”)
21
Hamber, Brandon, “Ere their Story Die: truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa” Race&Class,
Vol. 44 (1), 2002. Pg. 66
22
Borer, “Cautionary Notes from the TRC”, supra note 20, at 23.
23
See James Gibson’s “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2006 603:82. Pg. 103.
24
Lefko-Everett, Kate, Rorisang Lekalake, Erica Penfold and Sana Rais,“2010 South African Reconciliation
Barometer Survey Report.” Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. www.ijr.org.za (hereinafter SARB
2010).
20

16

with whom remains subject to debate. In this respect, the language of victims‘
and ‗perpetrators‘ that defined the work of the Commission, as originally
established by its founding Act, becomes important.
The TRC‘s framing of the past as a conflict between ‗victims‘ and
‗perpetrators‘ may have misrepresented the nature of relationships during
apartheid-which were essentially racial-

and could explain the unresolved

issues with race that surface in post-apartheid South Africa, which become
evident in both the Barometer and the Terreblanche and Reitz Four incidents.
The founding Act of the TRC makes use of these terms, by referring to
―perspectives of victims‖ or ―motives of persons responsible for the
commission of the violations‖.25 The TRC applied this language throughout its
work, arguing for example that reconciliation should encompass ―forgiveness
and healing between victim and perpetrator.‖26 This language is perceived as
problematic because it disregarded the many individuals who in one way or
another were involved in the system of apartheid: ―While the TRC certified
only approximately 20,000 individuals as victims and fewer than 10,000
individuals as perpetrators […] apartheid surely had more 30,000 victims and
perpetrators.‖27 In a similar vein, Mamdani argues that the South African TRC
left unaddressed the all-pervading nature of apartheid, a regime that did not
target a particular number of individuals but rather attacked whole

25

TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55.
TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55.
27
Borer, “A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators”, supra note 17, at 1102.
26

17

communities.28 In light of Tina Rosenberg‘s description of ―criminal regimes‖,
one can begin to see how the violations of apartheid were largely
bureaucratized and carried out by entire organizations.

29

This fact carried

important implications, since it was difficult to spread the blame across all
sectors of society. Mamdani says that accountability was not justly distributed,
since the ‗beneficiaries‘, those who by virtue of their whiteness benefited from
the regime, did not fall under the scope of work of the TRC in terms of
perpetrators. He poses the question: ―How will those who continue to be the
beneficiaries of apartheid, a substantial minority, and those who continue to be
its victims, the majority, live together?‖30 In a survey carried out by the Institute
for Justice and Reconciliation in 2003, less than a third of former beneficiaries
acknowledged that they benefited from apartheid.31 Hence, the ‗victims‘ and
‗perpetrators‘ categories may have entailed the disengagement from ―black and
white‖issues.

32

In this discussion, the role of the media in engaging larger

society in the TRC process is crucial.
The media played a key role throughout the life of the TRC. Alex Boraine
has recognized how the Commission owes much of its success to the media,
and how the entire effort of the TRC could have been wasted had it not been for
the active involvement of broadcasting agencies, the press and the radio to

28

Mamdani, Mahmood. “A Diminished Truth”, W. James and L. Van de Vijver eds. After the TRC:
reflection on truth and reconciliation in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip, 2000. Pg. 59
29
Rosenberg, Tina. “Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.” Alex Boraine, Janet
Levy and Ronel Scheffer, eds. IDASA. Cape Town: Clyson Printers. Pg. 96
30
Mamdani, 59
31
Valji, Nahla. “Race and Recociliation in Post-TRC South Africa”, paper presented at a conference
entitled Ten Years of Democracy in Southern Africa. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
Web. http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/racism/raceandreconciliation.pdf
32
Fullard, 32
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convey to South African society what came out of the hearings.33 The
relationship between the TRC and the media has been described as
―symbiotic,‖34 a term that refers to the manner in which they have impacted
each other. For instance, one analysis that was carried out in 1997 placed the
success or the failure of the Commission on the work of the media: ―Television,
newspaper and radio journalists are going to observe this delicate and
necessary operation and when they turn away from the operating table and
report to the waiting world outside, their reports will be as important as the
work of the commissioners themselves in determining whether the operation
was a success or not.‖35 In the same manner, in reporting what was coming out
of the TRC process, media workers also found themselves examining their own
positions in relation to the past that the TRC was working with: ―…As the
process […] unfolded, journalists […] found themselves being pulled into the
events covered. Some were victims of human rights abuses themselves; some
were perpetrators; some found themselves implicated as part of the group who
benefited from apartheid.‖36 These statements reveal the relevance of looking at
the role of the media in the transitional justice process and the relationship it
had with the TRC. Particularly important to investigate is how the media may

33

Garman, Anthea. “How the TRC and the media have impacted on each other.” Track Two journal of
the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6 No. 3&4, December 1997. Web.
http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/6_34/p36_garman.html (hereinafter Garman, “How the TRC and
the media have impacted on each other”)
34
Krabill, Ron. “Symbiosis: mass media and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.”
Media Culture Society 2001 23:567.
35
Bird, Edward and Zureida Garda. “Reporting the Truth Commission: Analysis of Media Coverage of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.” International Communication Gazette. October
1997. Pg. 334
36
Garman, “How the TRC and the media have impacted on each other”, supra note 33.
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have added to the dismissal of race and racism as explanatory variables of the
events that fell under the purview of the Commission‘s work.
The media‘s coverage of the TRC may have downplayed a debate on the
elements of race and racism and their relation to crimes of the past. According
to findings of the Media Monitoring Group, the media projected the cases of the
Commission in political and human rights terms, with minimal reference to
race and racism.37 They limited their work to mere reporting without engaging
in a more critical approach to the process, a fact that some regard as having
undermined the role of investigative journalism in South Africa. 38 Furthermore,
some groups within the media were in an ambivalent position, because from
having once been ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid they suddenly became key players
in the reconciliation process.39 This contradiction was best exposed through the
institutional hearings of the TRC‘s Human Rights Violations Committee.
Among other sectors of society, the media were called to account in these
hearings as a way to explore their involvement during apartheid and delve into
a more tangible discussion about the structural aspects of the regime. 40 These
discussions and others will be furthered in the thesis with the hope that the
impact of the transitional justice process on race relations in South Africa will
come to the surface more clearly.

37

MMP, supra note 8
Rolston, Bill. “Facing Reality: The media, the past and conflict transformation in Northern Ireland.”
Crime, Media, Culture. 2007 3:345. Pg. 355
39
Rolston, supra note 38
40
Fullard, 35
38
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In Chapter 2, some of the most prominent views and arguments of the
literature on truth commissions and media in transitional justice processes will
be discussed. This discussion will help to identify how this thesis adds to the
assessment literature on truth commissions in general. In chapter 3, the origins
of the TRC will be described, followed by a discussion of the main critiques of
the Commission and the media‘s work will follow. The chapter will focus on
the political negotiations that shaped some of the key aspects of the transitional
justice process that followed the end of apartheid, the reasons for which judicial
trials were ruled out and the events that led to the insertion of the provision of
amnesty in the post-amble of the new Constitution. A description of the Act
that established the TRC and the implications of the terminology that
Commissioners had to use will be examined, because these implications build
much of the basis of scholarly critique of the truth-telling process of South
Africa. Related to this, the debate about the impact of the TRC process and the
media on race relations will be expanded. In chapter 4, a look at both James
Gibson‘s findings about race relations and data from South African
Reconciliation Barometer will reveal the complexity that is inherent to analyses
of racial reconciliation in the country. For this reason, an analysis of two major
events that involved discussion on the state of race relations in South Africa-the
Reitz Four incident and the murder of Eugene Terre‘Blanche-is warranted.
These events will be the case studies for testing the hypothesis of this thesis. In
chapter 5, the connections between the findings of these cases, the questions

21

that motivated this research and the literature on truth commissions and media
in general will be forwarded.

22

2. Truth Commissions:
Assessment in Retrospect

23

T

he establishment of truth commissions in the aftermath of violent
conflicts has become commonplace. Starting with the demise of

authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1980s, more than thirty truth
commissions in different countries around the world have been established.41
At a basic level, these bodies are set up for the purpose of investigating gross
violations of human rights that were carried out at during the time period of a
particular regime.42 The establishment of these truth commissions, however,
does not bring closure to the debate about how societies should deal with their
past. The field of transitional justice encompasses a range of mechanisms that
can serve to hold the supporters of a previous regime as well as those opposed
to it accountable for the violations of human rights that took place throughout
that regime‘s term.43 Countries that have gone through a transition to
democracy, like some in Latin American and the Balkans region, have
particularly rich histories in this field. As these countries strove to implement
democratic governments and instill a human rights culture, the question of how
to move on from their pasts became more pressing.
People have held different views about which mechanisms are the most
appropriate for establishing justice in a post-conflict society. On one side, there
is always support for punishment of former perpetrators in the form of
prosecutions. Judiciary trials can deliver this form of justice. On the other side,
41

“Transitional Justice”, International Center for Transitional Justice. Web. Accessed on March, 2011 at
http://es.ictj.org/static/TJApproaches/WhatisTJ/
42
supra note 41
43
Borer, Tristan. “Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity: A Theoretical Overview”, Tristan Borer ed.
Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies. Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Pg. 17 (hereinafter Borer, “Truth Telling as a Peace Building
Activity”).
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there are those who value disclosure of the truth about past violations and
redress for the wrongdoing that has been done by means other than
prosecutions. Truth commissions are usually favored among individuals in the
latter group. These commissions are not necessarily limited to collecting the
facts of the past. In fact, a central premise is that this exercise will have an effect
on the future, in the sense that exposure and condemnation of certain past
events will prevent their repetition.44 Truth commissions are often put in place
with other defining expectations, such as providing an official platform where
victims can commence healing through acknowledgement of their suffering.
Also, through the often public shaming that could accompany the open
disclosure of wrongdoings, truth commissions might provide some degree of
punishment to perpetrators.45 Yet, as the transitional justice field evolves, and
the likelihood that truth telling mechanisms become more standard procedure
grows, the ideas and expectations that motivate their promotion still remain
largely untested.
The assessment of truth telling processes poses challenges to empirical
research that begin in the field of transitional justice. Hugo van der Merwe
recognizes two main issues that are difficult to address or to measure regarding
mechanisms of justice in times of transition. The first issue, he says, is the lack
of agreement of what justice should look like in the context of a transition, as it
has already been mentioned.46 What are the appropriate justice procedures and
44
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what would the outcome of such procedures be? The second issue, with which
this thesis is particularly concerned, has to do with the lack of consensus on
assessment of the impact of a justice mechanism.47 In the words of van der
Merwe, after the implementation of a transitional justice process, has justice
actually been delivered? If so, to what extent?48 These are difficult questions to
answer that also apply to understandings of truth telling mechanisms. Do truth
telling processes achieve the number of expectations that are assigned to them
in reality? What research methods can elucidate the degree to which the work
of truth commissions has an effect? For the international acclaim that it received
in the past and the constant recognition it still has in academic circles, the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is a good case in point for
a much needed review of what truth commissions can accomplish in actuality.
The TRC is arguably one of the most widely known models of a robust
truth-telling process. It is also one of the most studied and debated truth
commissions in academia.49 However, beyond the fact that scholars have
discussed at length the factors that led to the establishment of the TRC, as well
as the shortcomings and the successes of the process, analyses of the impact of
the Commission in the long term may only begin to be reasonably feasible nowclose to ten years after the TRC ceased its work officially. Thus, this thesis has
the privilege of hindsight. With more perspective, the effect of the
Commission‘s work can be assessed from different angles, and many events
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have taken place in South Africa since the Commission finished its work that
offer opportunities for more in-depth analysis. An exercise in retrospection and
an effort to draw the possible connections between the transitional justice
process and the present is not only important for understanding the scope of
influence of the Commission in South Africa. On a general level, the social and
political features of the periods that follow truth commissions need to be taken
into account to see the ways in which the premises for the establishment of
these commissions (one of the central premises being that looking at the crimes
that were committed in the past will guarantee that they are never again
repeated) materialize. Only by continuously testing the connection between the
premises and the facts on the ground, knowledge about areas of strength and
areas where truth commissions can improve be gleaned.
In an attempt to add a research project that can be of value to the
transitional justice literature, this thesis will look at contemporary race relations
in South Africa as not only defined by the still recent history of apartheid, but
as deeply connected to the transitional process that succeeded the demise of the
racist regime. In fact, the notion of a ―post-TRC South Africa‖ suggests that the
Commission‘s work may have transcended into the present as it was originally
expected.50 Have the goals of ―national unity and reconciliation‖, as stated in
the Post-amble that sanctioned the TRC, been achieved? In regards to
contemporary forms of racism, can they be attributed to some failure in the
50
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work of the Commission? Before these questions are considered, an overview of
different transitional justice mechanisms is warranted
Transitional Justice
Measures of justice respond to the particular needs of the contexts in
which they are applied. They are also contingent upon the social and political
processes that lead to their implementation. When countries undergo a
transition from a regime that sanctioned violations of human rights to one that
strives to embrace a culture that rejects those same violations and wants to
uphold democratic standards, the question of how to achieve justice becomes
crucial. The field of transitional justice covers the array of possible answers to
this question. The International Center for Transitional Justice, perhaps the
major think tank in the field, identifies the following transitional justice
initiatives: criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs,
gender justice, and memorialization projects.51 Also, local or ―traditional‖
rituals that have value in communities are beginning to figure as valid
mechanisms that can accompany other transitional justice measures.52
The establishment of these initiatives depends on the circumstances of
the transitional period of a country, such as the type of political dispensations
and sometimes even the cultural values of a society. Nevertheless, for almost
every society that has emerged from a period of violent conflict, the question of
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justice has emerged.53 A tension generally arises between people who call for
the application of what Neil Kritz calls ―non-criminal sanctions‖ and those who
advocate for the prosecutions of people who are accused of certain crimes.54
The implementation of a retributive justice process, in the form of
criminal trials and the adoption of punishment measures is one approach in the
pursuit of a break from the past. Kritz explains that the foundational support
for retribution is that only swift condemnation of past crimes will place a new
government apart from the predecessor.55 Indeed, Juan Mendez warns that not
abiding by the rule of law could be taken as tacit complicity with the
wrongdoers, which could undermine the legitimacy of the new government. He
says: ―One of the political arguments for prosecution is that if we are building a
new democracy we must start with a non-discriminatory application of the
law.‖56 Furthermore, he also stresses that for certain crimes, such as torture or
murder on a massive and systematic scale, nothing short of prosecutions should
be admissible: ―In cases of crimes against humanity, there is always a clear duty
to prosecute and not to give amnesties or pardons.‖57 This is a view that is more
commonly shared among victims of violations of human rights. Their demand
for prosecutions stems from the perception that the only way to achieve justice
is by punishing perpetrators for their deeds. For many of them, the idea of
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foregoing trials and punishment for truth commissions and in some cases
amnesty can be hard to accept.58 In South Africa, many victims expressed that
the TRC process engendered a sense of betrayal in them, particularly the
provision of amnesty to some perpetrators. They argued that their right to
justice had been traded for truth, and that compensations or reparations could
not be a real substitute for punishment.59 At the same time, some former regime
supporters in South Africa argued that did not want to become victims of
―retributive witch hunts.‖60 However, moral, legal and practical reasons, to be
detailed in Chapter 3, precluded the adoption of a punitive process as the
avenue for justice in post-apartheid South Africa.
In transitional contexts, justice measures are as much tied to the political
environment as they are to pragmatic calculations. The nature of the transition
from one regime to another and the length of the previous regime‘s tenure often
determine the transitional justice mechanism that is ultimately chosen. Some
political transitions, according to Chilean philosopher Jose Zalaquett, diminish
the prospects of trials. For example, if the former regime has not lost all of its
power, there will have to be more room for compromise, which could entail
ruling out punitive trials. The cases of post-WWII Germany and Japan are
telling: ―The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials could work the way they did only
because the guilty lost their political power and their guns. Their defeat was
complete and the conquerors needed only to wrestle with their own sense of
58
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justice.‖61 In South Africa, however, the National Party did not lose its hold of
power completely and could still influence the outcome of debates on justice
measures for apartheid supporters. For instance, the amnesty clause of the
interim Constitution‘s post-amble reflected the compromises of the political
negotiations that preceded the end of apartheid.62 Also, amnesty was a tangible
gesture to NP officials calmed their fears of being persecuted by ―retributive
witch hunts‖, as some referred to judiciary trials, after the elections.63 Important
as amnesty was to prevent deadlocks in the political negotiations, this
provision, however, significantly reduced the likelihood of punishment of
perpetrators.
Another reason why the implementation of criminal trials might be
limited is the scope of influence of the repressive regime. The more widespread
was a regime‘s influence in society, the harder it becomes to point at those who
should deserve punishment. Tina Rosenberg notes that the systematic nature of
the violations of apartheid made the prospect of prosecuting every human
rights violator hardly attainable. She says that apartheid was not a system in
which only a few within it committed transgression. Instead, the system as a
whole was a transgression, inducing large numbers of people to take part in
those transgressions. Apartheid as a whole was a ―criminal regime‖, similar to
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the Eastern European cases.64 Hence, apart from being possibly too costly to
carry out trials, it might be too complicated to apply fair punitive measures.
Moreover, Kritz says that in some places the previous regime could have been
in place for such a long period of time that the only people who have the
practical knowledge to run basic administrative tasks of government are
precisely the ones who would be targeted by policies such as the ones carried
out in France and Czech Republic. The absence of these administrative
personnel could endanger the viability of institutions of key relevance for the
new government.65 Aside from these purely practical reasons, there are also
legal norms that weaken the case for retributive processes of justice.
The legitimacy of the democratic foundations of a new regime could be
threatened in the face of a blind punitive process. Kritz says that the rule of law
protects individuals from collective punishment in cases where the possibility
of removing former regime workers from the state apparatus is considered.66
The rule of law guarantees that political affiliation would not suffice as a reason
for expelling people from their job places, unless there is evidence of individual
wrongdoing.67 Similarly, Rosenberg argues that basic legal principles that
underscore democratic orders prevent the prosecution of people ―for an act
which was not criminal at the time it was committed‖ (i.e. ex post facto and nulla
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poena sine lege).68 Hence, a new government which aims to punish individuals
by virtue of who they were associated with in the past can actually run counter
to what the rule of law establishes. Such punishment method risk the
democratic credentials that a new government wants to earn, and will possibly
alienate sectors of the population which are crucial in supporting the new
system.69 These are some of the arguments that underpin the support of justice
mechanisms that would be less likely to sow the grounds for revenge or
retaliation.
Beyond the legal and practical reasons motivating the choice of a justice
mechanism other than criminal trials, there is a strong body of literature that
highlights the benefits of the disclosure of truth about the past in a democratic
transition. According to Zalaquett, in the aftermath of a repressive regime, what
is important is to gather as much truth about the past as it is possible in order to
prevent its repetition. He says, ―If you are going to prevent something, you
must know what it is that you want to prevent. If you are going to repair, what
is it that you are going to repair?‖70 Criminal trials could be an avenue through
which accurate information might be gathered. However, in Zalaquett‘s view,
trials are unfit for the purpose of truth gathering, especially if the aim is not
limited to holding people to account but also steering a national debate.71
Furthermore, trials can undermine justice, especially in cases of total victory
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where the winners can engage in extensive punishment that may not
necessarily be reflective of a pursuit of justice but rather of vengeance. 72 Most
importantly, there should be an effort to place peoples‘ actions in context before
hurrying to judge them individually. Zalaquett argues that most people act in
ways that respond to the context in which they are placed.73 Under most
circumstances, people are more likely to abide by social rules that appear
legitimate rather than defy them and risk stigmatization. The question that
follows is: how to apply measures of punishment that individuals should
receive when the system under which they committed violations actually
sanctioned those violations? In this case, punitive trials can be rather
inadequate for such complex scenarios. Sometimes what is important is to
understand this complexity rather than to assign culpability to a particular side
of a conflict. In this respect, a truth commission can be an effective option to
mediate with the demands for justice and to establish fair measures of
accountability.
Truth Commissions
At a basic level, truth commissions are an alternative justice mechanism
that responds to the question of how to deal with the past. Regardless of the
mandate terms that may establish truth commissions, a backward-looking
quality is the common denominator among them.74 Priscilla Hayner outlines the
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following basic aims of a truth commission: ―To discover, clarify, and formally
acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute
to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and
recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the
past.‖75 A number of untested assumptions have emerged around these
qualities. One of the main assumptions is that societies need to learn about their
past in order to prevent future conflict. 76 In this respect, the backward-looking
approach of a truth commission is meant to fulfill a preventive role in the
future. Also, through the recognition of the stories of previously disempowered
people, some important degree of justice could be achieved in the present.
Another assumption is that encouraging victims and perpetrators to come
together and talk about their stories can enable reconciliation among them.77
Alongside, learning about the needs of victims can facilitate the making of
recommendations for reform.78 Thus, truth commissions acquire a reparative or
restorative capacity. Although these and other assumptions are often
mentioned, the difficulty of corroborating their veracity with factual evidence
engenders a constant debate between those who support truth telling processes
and those who remain more skeptical about their effectiveness. This dimension
of the debate on truth commissions is important to keep in mind, and this thesis
will wrestle with it extensively. In examining whether race relations in South
Africa today are in any way a by-product of the transitional justice process that
75
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the country went through, the assumed capacities of prevention and restoration
of the TRC will be examined.
Truth Commissions: Prevention and Restoration
An aspect that is often attributed to truth commissions is their capacity to
collect and produce an account of the past that can help to prevent the
repetition of violent conflict. Through the disclosure of truth, facts can be
gathered to paint a more complete picture of the past, which in turn would
supposedly deter people from committing the same violations.79 Zalaquett says
that this is sometimes more important than prosecuting every human rights
violator. Apart from unifying a society, the elaboration of a collective history
might serve the desire of preventing future conflict better than the choice of
retributive justice. Having a common understanding of the past as opposed to
different and unreconciled versions of it can move society towards embracing
the same values: ―A community should not wipe out part of its past, because it
leaves a vacuum that will be filled by lies and contradictory, confusing accounts
of what happened. Identity is memory […] Identities forged out of halfremembered things or false memories easily commit transgressions.‖80 Alex
Boraine coincides with this view, saying that South Africans had to forge a
common memory that everybody -from apartheid official supporters, anti-
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apartheid fighters, and the people who claimed ignorance of what was taking
place in their own country- would recognize.81
Not all societies that have undergone a violent period in their history
have chosen to delve into their past though, including post-Franco Spain or
Mozambique. Factors like political arrangements or fears of destabilizing the
new order by reviving the memory of traumatic events may inhibit the
establishment of truth commissions.82 Nevertheless, Paul van Zyl believes that
when societies embark upon a truth telling process, they also initiate an
important process of collective judgment, especially when accounts of human
rights violations are delivered to society from an angle that motivates the
condemnation of these violations. Apart from knowing about the human rights
violations that happened in the past, he says, understanding why they are
wrong is essential in order to prevent their recurrence.83 Scholars like Charles
Maier, however, remain more skeptical about of the benefits that the truth of
truth commissions can provide.
Maier argues that the truth that comes from truth commissions cannot be
history because truth commissions face significant challenges when gathering
past accounts. He says that even though truth commissions want to collect a
wide range of voices, the task of gathering stories should not be left in the
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hands of a truth commission solely.84 Historians, for instance, have a duty to
explore the array of options that were available to different sides in a conflict,
making it more feasible to assign due responsibility. In his view, truth
commissions are less likely to do so since they can be more focused on other
goals (i.e. repentance, confession) than judgment or allocation of blame. 85 For
this reason, the findings of a truth commission, which are usually compiled in
an official report, have to be seen as important pieces of a bigger whole, but
never the unique narrative of the past.
Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, who were deeply
involved in the writing of the South African TRC report, confirm the challenges
that Maier refers to. They claim that in fact, putting together all the material that
the Commission gathered was an undertaking of much complexity for a
number of reasons. Although the TRC already precluded the inclusion of the
voices of many victims of apartheid due to its ―narrow mandate and short life
span‖, investigating all the atrocities that people denounced or including every
one of their stories became an insurmountable task.86 For example, limited
resources constrained the investigative capacity of the Commission, and the
need to synthesize the large amount of information that was accumulated into a
coherent and accessible reading material meant that only some accounts
84
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registered in the official report.87 Moreover, even though the TRC held sectoral
and institutional hearings to delve deeper into the role of a number of
establishments during apartheid, Maier considers that the Commission could
have not provided a complete picture of the past because that would have
entailed concentrating much more on the institutions on which the apartheid
regime rested.88 For all these reasons, Villa-Vicencio says that the limited scope
of the TRC report calls onto journalists, politicians, writers and others to
continue the work that the Commission started.89 His judgment of the reportthat it constitutes a roadmap which others can use- can be applied to truth
commissions‘ reports in general. If this is the case, the weight of preventing
conflict would spread out, and a truth commission would be treated as one
body out of many in society carrying this weight. This idea is particularly
relevant for this thesis because it brings up an aspect that is worth considering:
to what extent can the TRC, as well as other truth commissions, be held
accountable for issues that remain in their aftermath? Hugo van der Merwe‘s
words resonate here: ―There is only so much that a truth commission can do.‖90
Similar arguments are drawn around the restorative capacity of truth
commissions.
In societies emerging from divisive conflict, the need to restore the
broken social fabric becomes crucial to establish some measure of stability. This
need is directly related to restorative justice, which according to Jennifer
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Llewellyn, is a theory of justice which ―[…] is concerned with restoring
relationships harmed by wrongdoing to ones in which all parties enjoy and
accord one another equal dignity, respect and concern.‖91 She explains that
truth telling mechanisms may adopt restorative justice elements. For instance,
the South African TRC a helpful model of what ―restorative justice-based
institution‖ could look like. In her view, the following elements made up the
restorative justice character of this truth commission in particular: the provision
of amnesty to perpetrators; the opportunity that victims were given to tell their
stories; the public nature of the process; and the forward-looking approach of
the Commission.92 All of these elements made the TRC process more inclusive
and allowed an opportunity to restore previously damaged social relations. At
the same time, Llewellyn asserts that the TRC had limitations that might have
diminished its restorative capacity, such as the fact that the cases of victims and
perpetrators were dealt by different committees (the Human Rights Violations
Committee for the former and the Amnesty Committee for the latter).
Llewellyn argues that this arrangement is problematic from a restorative justice
perspective. She says that there fewer chances of ―face-to-face‖ encounter
between victims and perpetrators that could enable dialogue about past harms
and measures of redress among them, which is considered to be an important
step in restorative justice.93 In spite of this and other challenges that the TRC
faced, the basic idea is that truth telling mechanisms have a restorative potential
91
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because they can help set the ground for a future marked by different ways of
relating to one another than in the past. Along this idea is that other
assumptions emerge which associate truth telling with reconciliation and
healing.
If promoting reconciliation and restoring dignity to victims rank high in
the list of expectations, Martha Minow argues that truth commissions are better
suited for the task than trials.94 Opposite to the retributive character that is more
commonly present in the event of prosecutions, truth commissions promote
values of compassion and peace, which are vital for stability.95 Indeed, many
victims in South Africa expressed that the act of coming forward before the TRC
and talking about their suffering helped them heal and move forward. Some of
them said that in some way, the public recognition of what they went through
restored their dignity. 96 Alex Boraine classifies this as the healing and restorative
truth, which involves disclosure and acknowledgment. In his view, ―deeply
divided societies cannot rely on punishment to heal and to reconcile their
several communities‖, whereas the exercise of truth telling can contribute to a
healing process that might do so.97 Yet, this statement like a number of others
need assessments to see whether truth commissions can in fact accomplish what
is expected of them.
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The preventive and restorative capacities of truth commissions, and the
number of other assumptions that surround them, need to be tested in order to
establish expectations that do match up to the real potential of this alternative
mechanism of justice. Hayner says that most often, expectations are much
greater than what truth commissions achieve in reality: ―Some of these
expectations are simply not realistic in circumstances where there were
thousands upon thousands of victims, where democratic institutions remain
very weak, and where the will of perpetrators to express remorse or participate
in reconciliatory exercises is tenuous, at best.‖98 Due to the prevalence of these
grand assumptions, the real contributions of truth commissions are minimized
and remain unappreciated.99 For this reason, the assessment literature needs to
be strengthened to demystify the assumed capacities of truth telling processes
so that a clearer picture of the benefits they do bring takes the forefront of
discussions.
The field of transitional justice, and truth commissions as one mechanism
within this field, need more evaluation of their impact. In ―Assessing the
Impact of Transitional Justice‖, van der Merwe et al. outline the many
challenges that exist for empirical research, but also the necessity of establishing
appropriate research methods that can demonstrate what transitional justice
mechanisms accomplish. In regards to truth-telling processes, Tristan Borer
identifies two main problems in the ‗assessment literature‘: the lack of
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conceptual clarity and the conflation of ―aspiration with empiricism.‖ 100 First,
she lists over twenty concepts that are associated with truth commissions,
although how these concepts are in fact well-related to truth-telling processes
and whether they can be realistically delivered remains to be studied.101
Strongly related to this point is a second issue of assessment, which is what
Borer describes as the problematic ―[…] phenomenon of equating ‗aspiration
with empiricism.‖102 In other words, what often are no more than claims or
unproven expectations about truth commissions eventually become facts. That
truth heals, or that it leads to reconciliation, are statements that although time
and again are linked to truth-telling processes, they nevertheless still need
evaluation.
The largely uncontested idea that truth fosters reconciliation has
prompted the attention of some scholars. Hayner says: ―The goal of
reconciliation has been so closely associated with some past truth commissions
that many casual observers assume that reconciliation is an integral, or even
primary, purpose of creating a truth commission, which is not always true.‖103
Similarly, Robert Rotberg takes an issue with this loose association, arguing that
it is an unproven assumption that reconciliation or restoration is attainable
through the exercise of truth telling. Rotberg asks: ―does the truth commission
method, with its transparency and attendant publicity, retard or advance the
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process [of achieving reconciliation]?104 For instance, the very motto of the TRC,
―Truth: the Road to Reconciliation‖, assumed a causal relationship. He says that
the TRC functioned under the somewhat unchallenged conviction that
reconciliation could be possible, ―…as if retelling the truth of the deepest
machinations of apartheid-the culpability of its highest leaders and its maddoctor schemes of biological and chemical warfare- would somehow set South
Africa free to forge a successful multiracial society.‖105 In this respect, Borer
warns that evaluations of the success of the TRC on the basis of whether or not
it fostered reconciliation among South Africans are problematic for two main
reasons. First, the truth-reconciliation connection makes it seem as if
reconciliation is the only way to measure success.106 Second, the very concept of
reconciliation is not a conclusive one, because it can have multiple meanings.107
The hypothesis of this thesis positions it within the assessment literature.
The questions that motivate this research tackle the need of further research on
impact of truth commissions –in this case, the TRC-that scholars refer to. Fifteen
years after the end of apartheid, these questions are even timelier. Did the truth
telling process of South Africa help to prevent the repetition of past abuses?
More specifically, did it help to undermine the racism that characterized the
past? Did the TRC establish a clean break from the regime that preceded the
democratic order? Within this interrogatory framework, what should be clear is
that the TRC, as other truth telling projects around the world, cannot be judged
104
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as if it were the sole entity responsible of such a daunting task as pushing a
whole country away from the horrors of the past. The TRC had the support of
different elements in society, starting from the government, religious groups,
and human rights activists among others, in carrying out its work. Yet, the
visibility of the truth telling process was largely a function of the relentless
attention that the media gave to it. For this reason, attention to how their work
could have affected the process and the outcome of the TRC is important. A
review of the literature on this aspect, the role of the media in a transitional
justice context, is thus necessary.
Media in Transitional Justice
A key intervening variable of a truth telling process is how engaged the
public is with it. Findings of a truth commission may or may not be made
available to people in general, but in order to attain their goals, there is an
underlying assumption that the information gathered at a truth commission
should reach the widest possible audiences. In this respect, Lisa Laplante and
Kelly Phenicie say that ―transitional justice projects inevitably rely on the media
to reach their goals of disseminating the truth about a dark period of a
country‘s history.‖108 Apart from the official report that a truth commission can
release, the media109 have the power to bring people closer to the process by
directing their attention to it. For this reason, the way newspapers, broadcasting
108
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agencies and radio stations handle truth commission accounts and the events of
truth-telling processes is crucial.
In South Africa, the deep involvement of the media with the TRC has
been regarded as a unique and vital aspect of the democratic transition.
Accordingly, an assessment of the Commission‘s work will and perhaps should
always consider the impact that media work could have had on the process,
and this is true not only for the TRC but for other truth commissions as well.
Thereby, this thesis will analyze the work of the Commission as the central
establishment of the transitional justice period of South Africa, but will remain
attentive to the large influence of the print media in this period to reach a more
accurate conclusion. It should be noted that even though the connection
between the media and transitional justice – and truth commissions specificallyseems obvious, there appears to be a lack of in-depth research on this
connection.110 Not much work has been done concerning peace processes and
the involvement of the media either.111 Nonetheless, for the research that has
been done on these two related areas, the following themes are highlighted: the
power of news framing, the possibilities of furthering peace, and the limitations
of media in transitional justice schemes.
Journalists choose the angle of framework of truth commissions‘
coverage, and these choices have implications on truth-telling processes that are
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worth considering. Much of the weight of the relevance of the media comes
from the power they possess when processing information. Tomas Nelson et al
say that how readers respond to information transmitted to them is a function
of framing, which is a ―…process by which a communication source, such as a
news organization, defines and constructs a political issues or public
controversy.‖112 Similarly, Gadi Wolfsfed states: ―The power of journalistic
framing rests on the ‗social construction of reality theory‘, which posits that the
meaning of events is not inherent in ‗a fundamentally ambiguous social world‘
but rather is created by the press.‖113 It is not a question of what events are told,
but how they are told that can make a huge difference. 114 This idea
automatically places a fair amount of responsibility on journalists, because they
are the ones who decide what aspects of a story to emphasize: ―…Journalists
are responsible for not only reporting information, but also processing it, as
opposed to leaving it in crude form.‖115 This is why Laplante argues that in
some cases, the work of the media can be blamed for the deterioration or the
advancement of a peace process. The continuity of conflict, she says, ―may be
attributed, in part, to the media‘s failure to adequately mediate conflicting
views of a country‘s history-its causes and consequences, its villains and
heroes.‖116 In the same manner, Ellen and Daniel Yamshom stress the media‘s
potential in fulfilling the goal of reconciliation that some truth commissions aim

112

Nelson, Tomas, Rosalee Clawson and Zoe Oxley. “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its
Effect on Tolerance”, 91 AM. Political Science Review, 567, 1997.
113
Wolfsfed, Gadi. “Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East”. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
114
Wolfsfed, Gadi. “Media and the Path to Peace”, supra note 111, at 15
115
Laplante et al., “The Media’s Role in Transitional Justice Processes”, supra note 108, at 273
116
Laplante et al., “The Media’s Role in Transitional Justice Processes”, supra note 108, at 252

47

for.117 Although truth commissions bear the main task of mediating the
different accounts and demands of people in the aftermath of conflict, Laplante
says that the configuration of a ―collective memory‖ requires the involvement
of the media ―to encourage consensus-making about the past.‖118 In fact,
Escudero Scott et al regard the media as ―the chief cultural guardians of
national memories‖, which is one reason they are invariably related to truth
commissions in their pursuit of putting the past on record.119
While media outlets might promote values that could serve the goals of
transitional justice mechanisms, they are still limited by a number of important
factors. According to Wolfsfed, the press can establish the character of a
national debate by emphasizing certain ideas and arguments. News headlines
and slogans, as carriers of ideologies, can affect people‘s perception on an
issue.120 Popular images of the enemy can be altered to change the public‘s
opinion and to mobilize for peace rather than war.121 This could also necessitate
change in the way the media work. Laplante suggests that journalists need to be
trained to frame the news in a way that will serve the purpose of transitional
justice scheme.
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If the goal is to disseminate the idea that human rights

violations are wrong, for instance, then the media ought to know how to convey
this message with their choice of news angle. At the same time, the media have
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to convey their stories in a simple manner sometimes, which makes it harder to
portray the complexity of a conflict. Wolfsfed says that for issues of timing and
space, journalists need to build their stories on ―short and uncomplicated‖
storylines. He adds, ―The news media are more likely to cover personalities
than institutions, to prefer good visuals over complex texts, and to deal with
specific opinions rather than general ideologies.‖123 This is particularly
problematic for truth commissions, especially if they want to paint a complete
and complex picture of the past. Neglecting the larger issues that lurk behind
particular events risks over-simplification and misunderstanding on the part of
the audience. In addition to this, Laplante explains how the journalistic value of
neutrality may run counter to transitional justice aims. ―[…] When a society
needs a new direction in public discourse, […] merely ‗reporting what each side
says‘ does not always ensure a fruitful discussion that leads to the
establishment of a collective memory and national reconciliation.‖124 Of crucial
importance is also the fact that sometimes the media are in a dual position
within the transitional justice process itself. ―The media,‖ Laplante says, ―[are]
both direct actor(s) in transitional justice and its subject(s).‖ 125 This statement
resonates with particular strength when looking at the stance of the media
during apartheid and the TRC process, an aspect that will be crucial to
understand the criticism about the media in the transitional justice period.
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As this chapter has sketched out some of the most important arguments
surrounding transitional justice mechanisms, the role of truth commissions and
the impact of the media in these contexts, it becomes clearer why some scholars
call for further assessment in light of contemporary events. Before turning to
the main analytical goal of this thesis, an exploration of the political
negotiations that contributed to the demise of apartheid will follow.
Understanding the compromises that had to be made in the run-up to the
elections in 1994 is important because these compromises shaped the
transitional justice process to a great extent. This examination will be the first
step to learn why the TRC worked the way it did specifically, and where much
of the criticism of its work comes from.
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3. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
The Commitment to Reconciliation and
Its Limitations
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“…I do not believe a truth commission should take political decisions. If that is the intention, it is doomed
to lack credibility from the start. I do not believe that any court, be it a truth commission, court of law,
any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, can define its own terms of reference. These have to be
determined by the politicians, who may find it easy, perhaps tempting, not to take difficult and unpopular
decisions. However, these are decisions that have to be taken even before a truth commission or any other
process can get under way.”126

P

rior to the end of apartheid, a number of political leaders and civil
society organizations began to envision the need to put South

Africa on the path towards a transitional justice process. Although the
democratic elections of 1994 would mark the demise of the racist regime, many
challenges lay before and after this remarkable event. Inevitably, the task of
bridging the divide of a ruptured society would require extensive negotiations.
Hence, the question was: how could South Africans overcome the legacy of
apartheid and learn to coexist in a peaceful democratic environment? It was
argued that a decisive break from the former order was an essential step for the
emergence of a culture of human rights. A consensus in favor of establishing a
transitional justice mechanism that could put society on a sound moral
foundation began to emerge. The premise of the proposal for transitional
justice, as Guillermo O‘Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter have argued, is that a
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society will not be able to progress if it does not somehow tackle the
wrongdoings of the past.127
The perception that all South Africans, irrespective of their allegiances,
needed to examine their past deepened. Eventually, it became clearer that there
would be no chance of a peaceful democratic establishment if apartheid leaders
did not participate of the process leading towards that outcome; ―A peaceful
transition followed by a democratic order would not have been possible if the
former apartheid leaders did not actively play a role in creating this new
order.‖128 As a result, the question of justice and reconciliation was at the center
of many debates during the political negotiations that brought apartheid to its
end. Ultimately, political leaders and civil society groups decided that a truth
commission would be the most appropriate mechanism of transitional justice
for South Africa. In order to understand their decision, an examination of the
circumstances under which apartheid came to an end is necessary.
The Negotiated End of Apartheid
The end of apartheid was the product of years of negotiations between
the government, led by the National Party (NP), and anti-apartheid liberation
movements, the most prominent of which was the African National Congress
(ANC). Secret talks between government officials and Nelson Mandela had
already begun back in the mid-1980s when he was still a political prisoner at
Robben Island.129 Nevertheless, it would not be until F.W. De Klerk became
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President in 1989 that the course of the talks took a major shift. On 2 February
1990, De Klerk declared that the banning orders on the ANC and other political
parties would be lifted. At some point later when commenting on this historical
event, he would confess that he did not proceed to unban the political parties
because he had come to finally acknowledge the regime‘s unfairness. Instead,
he did so purely on pragmatic grounds. He realized that apartheid was no
longer workable and that dismantling it would actually serve the interests of his
party better. ―It was not a question of morality‖, he said, ―but of practical
politics.‖130 Beyond the question of whether or not De Klerk acted out of moral
enlightenment or opportunistic impulse, the release of Mandela became a
memorable moment in the history of South Africa. On 11 February 1990,
millions of people around the world watched this remarkable political leader of
the anti-apartheid struggle walk out of prison after twenty seven years of
imprisonment. 131 An era of political negotiations was about to begin.
A number of factors propelled the decision of the apartheid government
to enter negotiations with the liberation forces. Apart from mounting
international criticism of the apartheid regime, growing economic isolation and
global geopolitical changes such as the fall of the Berlin Wall gave the De Klerk
impetus to engage in more sweeping political reforms.132 Particularly, with the
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the alleged ‗communist threat‘ vanished, so the
National Party could no longer defend their actions by accusing the resistance
movement of trying to impose a communist regime in South Africa. At the
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same time, Allister Sparks says that De Klerk did not envision how negotiations
with the ANC and other major parties of the resistance would pave the way for
black-majority rule. Sparks affirms that ―…De Klerk did not expect his reforms
to lead to black-majority rule ―, and that in fact, he did not foresee ―the end of
Afrikaner nationalism before the end of the decade.‖ 133 If anything, he expected
a ―power-sharing‖ arrangement with members of the liberation forces in which
whites would still retain most power.134 Once the negotiations began, however,
he had to face the uncontainable political determination of the ANC, and how
this determination would limit the power of the NP tremendously.135 Yet, the
government was also resolute to keep its grip on power, so De Klerk developed
concepts around minority rights and demanded a system of enforcedcoalitions.136 This and other demands had their weight, because in reality the
government was not defeated militarily nor fully vanquished politically. This
meant that the NP still possessed considerable political leverage and could
affect the outcome of the negotiations that led to the first democratic elections.
The ANC found itself in a complex position during the negotiations,
since it had to deal with the same leaders who upheld a regime that the party
fought against for decades. At the most basic level, while NP leaders had to
acknowledge that their party could no longer sustain white-minority rule,
particularly in the face of economic stagnation and intensified international
condemnation of the oppressive regime, the ANC had to accept the somewhat
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heavier fact that the government would not lose full control of the state at least
for five years. This acceptance was reflected in various concessions, particularly
in the provision of a ‗sunset clause‘, and the temporary establishment of
multiparty government coalition known as ―Government of National Unity‖
(GNU), both of which will be further detailed below. Discussions on
appropriate mechanisms of justice also took into account the implications of the
position of the NP in the transition.
At a ―Justice in Transition‖ conference held in 1994 by the Institute for a
Democratic

South

Africa

(Idasa),

Dumisa

Ntsebeza

–a

future

TRC

Commissioner - reminded the attendants that ―…the government is not a
vanquished enemy. It is in power and still has armed forces in place.‖ 137 This
conference drew South African academics and experts from countries such as
Chile, Argentina and Bulgaria to discuss the possible ways South Africa could
deal with the legacy of apartheid.138 Any choice of a transitional justice
mechanism to address the past would be influenced by the very ones who
would most likely be the subjects of this mechanism. In the words of Tristan
Borer, ―The implications of having to keep the National Party on-board and
having to work side by side with those most likely to come under purview of
any mechanism for political justice was simple: the necessity of a high degree of
compromise in the development of such a mechanism.‖139 The provision of
amnesty in the post-amble of the Constitution was a notable example of a
137
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fundamental compromise, which was made in order to carry the negotiations
forwards and assure the democratic elections, but other compromises also took
place at different stages during the negotiations.
On the contentious issue of who should be part of the negotiations, it was
Mandela who put forward the ambitious proposal of having a convention of all
political organizations- later known as the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa (CODESA). In it, leaders of all parties negotiated the core contents of an
interim Constitution. The multiparty convention was significant because the
groundwork that would alter the injustices of apartheid would be lain in there.
In a sense, the very future of the democratic order of South Africa was at stake
throughout CODESA, as well as the real potential to transform the status quo of
a racially divided society. For these reasons, the process was marred with
tension and distrust from every side, since party leaders were well-aware of the
importance of every decision they arrived at.140 Moreover, deep-seated
disagreements among them surfaced, to the point of disrupting the flow of the
negotiations often. These disagreements became particularly relevant in 1993.
At the time, the ANC and the NP were divided over what type of system
would be the best to allocate power to parties in government. The NP
advocated for ―power-sharing‖, an arrangement that which subject the
decisions of the ANC or any other major party in Parliament to the veto power
of minority parties such as the NP. Not surprisingly, ANC leaders strongly
disagreed with this arrangement because it would essentially keep the political
140
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establishment of apartheid intact.141 ―The power of no,‖ comments Allister
Sparks, ―would remain in the hands of the old oligarchy […]The apartheid
thinkers had come a long way, but they were still not quite free of their
ideological mindset […]Now that they were having to go the whole hog and
grant universal franchise, they were still trying to ensure that whites could
protect the status quo by vetoing black decisions.‖142 Negotiations were stalled
around this issue, proof of the complexity of elaborating the interim
Constitution. Yet, negotiations needed to go on, and the issue of power
allocation had to be resolved to assure the realization of the democratic
elections.
At this critical juncture, a ‗sunset clause‘ proposed by Joe Slovo, then
head of the South African Communist Party (SACP), managed to break the
political deadlock that was keeping the process from moving forward. This
clause conceded to the NP‘s demand of establishing a power-sharing cabinet for
the period that would follow after the adoption of a new Constitution.143
According to it, the cabinet would be subject to proportional representation in
the executive.144 At the same time, the job positions of a predominantly
Afrikaner civil service, the police and the military were guaranteed for five
years.145 However, in order to ensure that this arrangement would not hinder
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the possibility of new developments in the democratic regime, the sunset clause
was set to remain only for the five-year period. No veto power was granted to
minority parties.146 By CODESA‘s end, it was decided that the country would
be governed by a power-sharing arrangement, named the Government of
National Unity (GNU), which would stay in place until 1999.147
When presenting his formula, Slovo made a point of stating what was a
fact: The expectation that NP officials, who still held power, would easily
surrender to the demands of the liberation movements were not realistic.148
Echoing the comments of others, he said: ―We [are] clearly not dealing with a
defeated enemy.‖149 The balance of political forces during the negotiations
made compromises of this kind realistically necessary, he suggested. In his
view, negotiations were not the justice end, but the means to justice, a ‗stage‘ in
the process of achieving a better and more legitimate position inside
government than the one the ANC and others held of that moment:
―Negotiations are only a part, and not the whole, of the struggle for real
people‘s power.‖150 As much as Slovo‘s proposal was strategically necessary,
the deal ensured that the bureaucracy of the old regime remained intact,
however. In other words, key privileges that apartheid conceded to whites
would be unchallenged for a period of time. A similar compromise of the
negotiated settlement was the provision of amnesty to perpetrators of political
crimes.
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On Amnesty
The question of how to deal with the legacy of apartheid was raised
throughout the course of the negotiations repeatedly. The demand for amnesty
for political crimes committed during apartheid was directly correlated to this
question, and it was one of the most difficult issues to resolve. In spite of the
great deal of controversy that the issue produced and the rejection of some
victims towards the very proposal151, amnesty was guaranteed in the interim
Constitution in a post-amble, which reads as follows:
―This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a
deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering
and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for
all South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class, belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens
and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and
the reconstruction of society.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall
be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with
political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the
past. . . . ―152
According to then Justice Minister Dullah Omar, amnesty was the inevitable
price for securing a peaceful transition.153 In reality, however, the insertion of
the clause did not occur without a great deal of contention and an exhaustive
search for consensus among the negotiating parties of the Constitution.
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In 1992, negotiations were stalled due to the government‘s proposal of
granting general amnesty to members of the security forces and the liberation
movements. 154 Yet, this proposal per se was not the main source of strain during
the negotiations. It was instead the NP‘s unilateral introduction of amnesty
legislation that became problematic. The NP, acting out of growing pressure
from right-wing elements and the security forces, passed the Further Indemnity
Act in spite of strong opposition from the ANC and other parties. This Act
granted the President the power to pardon any crime that was politically
motivated, and hence eroded the possibility of punishing apartheid
perpetrators for their actions.155 The Act provided that ultimately, the State
President could provide indemnity to ―the perpetrators of acts with a political
object advised, directed, commanded, ordered or performed…before 12:00 on 8
October 1990.‖156 Even though the preceding 1990 Indemnity Act, which spelled
out the terms under which liberators could receive indemnity and that had been
worked out by the ANC and government members, De Klerk sought to pass a
clause that would effectively rule out punitive trials. The liberation parties
condemned the government‘s action accordingly. Louren Du Plessis captures
this issue: ―The government acted unilaterally and did not consult any of its
major negotiating partners. This was in marked contrast to the culture of
negotiation

and

consultation

which

characterized

the

adoption

and

154

Borer, unpublished manuscript, supra note 153, at 9
Borer, unpublished manuscript, supra note 153, at 9
156
Du Plessis, Lourens. “Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa”, Alex Boraine,
Janet Levy and Ronel Scheffer, eds. Pg. 111.
155

61

implementation of the 1990 Indemnity Act.‖157 Although the 1992 Act caused
much resentment, it became the foundation for the provision of amnesty that
was included in the post-amble of the Constitution. The adoption of amnesty
had a direct effect on the subsequent transitional justice process. At the same
time, the establishment of punitive trials was also grounded in political, moral
and legal assessments.
The Origins of the South African Truth Commission
The ANC had already set a remarkable precedent before the official
establishment of the South African truth commission. In 1993, the Motsuenyane
Commission of Enquiry –an ANC-led commission tasked with investigating
accusations of human rights violations inside ANC training camps in exile–
concluded that gross violations of human rights had been committed by a
number of ANC members. In an outstanding move, the National Executive
Committee (NEC) of the ANC accepted the findings of the Commission‘s report
in public, and it expressed a deep sense of collective moral responsibility and
guilt for all those who suffered for the transgressions. 158 This event was a
historical milestone, as never before had a liberation movement held its own
members to account for human rights violations.159 In fact, according to Johnny
de Lange, the Motsuenyane Commission should be seen as part of the overall
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process of dealing with the country‘s past and achieving reconciliation.160 It was
from the process and the result of this Commission of Enquiry that the ANC
made a request to the government to establish a commission to deal with the
violations that took place in the country during apartheid.
The ANC-NEC, in responding to the report of the Montsuenyane
Commission, specified that a commission should be charged with the task of
looking at all the abuses of human rights that took place under apartheid.161
The NEC outlined the reasons behind its proposal for a truth commission, one
of which was the successful record of Latin American countries that had had
truth commissions:
―The most important reason for the establishment of such a commission
is to get to the truth. The experience of Chile, Argentina and El Salvador
keenly reflects the cleaning power of the truth. Thousands of people who
gave evidence rarely, if ever, showed a desire for vengeance. What
mattered to most was that the memory of their loved ones would not be
denigrated or forgotten and that such terrible things never happen
again.‖162
The NEC suggested that perpetrators within the ANC ranks should be dealt
with alongside other transgressors.163 Many believe that Kader Asmal had an
influential role in the drafting of the proposal of a commission of inquiry for the
ANC, and that he was the first one to put forward the idea of confronting the
past. In 1992, at a university lecture, he noted the idea of having a ―conscious
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understanding of the past‖ in order to look to the future. 164 In parallel, civil
society groups also took up the debate of how to deal with South Africa‘s past.
The ongoing talks between South African activists, experts, and
international advisors led towards a consensus that a truth commission should
be established in South Africa. For this matter, the Institute for a Democratic
South Africa (IDASA) was at the vanguard of a series of events set up for the
purpose of searching an agreement on the most appropriate transitional justice
mechanism. Under the auspices of this institute, in 1992 a group of South
Africans went to Eastern Europe to learn how these countries were facing the
challenges of their political transitions.165 Alex Boraine, then head of IDASA,
later met with experts like Lawrence Weschler who were working in the field of
transitional justice. In these occasions, he was particularly moved by Weschler‘s
accounts of the cases of Brazil and Uruguay; ―His book A Miracle, a Universe:
Settling Accounts with Torturers…was of enormous inspiration in contemplating
our situation in South Africa‖, Boraine has said.166 Following these events and
bearing in mind the added pressure of the fast approaching 1994 elections, two
conferences were held in South Africa to debate the subject of justice.
The inputs of lawyers, human rights activists, and Eastern European and
Latin American distinguished intellectuals, among others, served to further
cement the agreement that there was a pressing need to look at the human
rights violations that took place in the past. However, only after the elections,
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the consensus reached at the conferences translated into official petitions to the
new government for a truth commission.167 In a letter written to Nelson
Mandela only weeks after the elections, Alex Boraine outlined the reasons for
the establishment of a truth commission. He finalized the letter by saying that
only through―…the knowledge and awareness of [the] violations, the dealing
with them in terms of acknowledgment and compensation to victims and
possible prosecutions of some of the perpetrators could well assist in ensuring
that the long years of apartheid will never occur again in South Africa.‖ 168 With
Mandela‘s support for the proposal, the next and most significant step in
formalizing a South African truth commission was taken up by Parliament. This
was a remarkable development because the constitutional provision of amnesty
did not require the set up of a truth commission. In other words, amnesty could
have been granted without the establishment of a truth-telling process. The
post-amble of the Constitution did not impose disclosure of truth as a condition
for receiving this provision. Therefore, that the truth commission of South
Africa had the power to mediate this provision, binding it to full disclosure of
the facts about breaches committed in the past, set it apart from previous truth
commissions.
The Mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The new South African Parliament, through the 1995 Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34, created the South African Truth
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and Reconciliation Commission. In his presentation of the draft Act to
Parliament, Minister of Justice Dullah Omar began his speech as follows:
―I have the privilege and responsibility to introduce today a Bill which
provides a pathway, a stepping stone, towards the historic bridge of
which the Constitution speaks whereby our society can leave behind the
past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold
suffering and injustice, and commence the journey towards a future
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful
coexistence, and development opportunities for all South Africans
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.
Its substance is the very essence of the constitutional commitment to
reconciliation and the reconstruction of society. Its purpose is to provide
that secure foundation which the Constitution enjoins: ‗…for the people
of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which
generated gross human rights violations…and a legacy of hatred, fear,
guilt and revenge‘. ―169
The Minister‘s opening words put stress on the intent of institutionalizing what
the interim Constitution mandated. This Act would provide the platform of the
TRC‘s work.
Parliament vested the TRC with the task of fostering the reconciliation
and national unity enshrined in the post-amble of the interim Constitution. It is
important to note though that the TRC was not the only institution charged
with this mission. Other institutions such as the Land Claims Court, the
Constitutional Court, the Human Rights, the Gender and the Youth
Commissions were also conceived within a framework that stressed the
promotion of national unity and reconciliation in the new South Africa. 170
Another aspect to consider is that the proposal of setting up a truth commission
was not necessarily new or unfamiliar, as previously discussed, and neither was
169
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it set up without the formal objections of some prominent members of
society.171
The Act delineated the Commission‘s work in various ways. It outlined
its major goals, which in summary were: to determine a complete picture of the
causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights between
March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994; to facilitate the granting of amnesty to
perpetrators of crimes who came forward and disclosed the whole truth about
their acts while providing victims with a chance to share their stories; to
prepare a final report with all the findings of the Commission with
recommendations

to

prevent

future

human

rights

violations.172

The

Commission had to complete its work in eighteen months beginning in
December 15, 1995.

173

It was composed of seventeen commissioners, each of

whom was appointed by the President, with the chairmanship and vicechairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Alex Boraine respectively.174
Three committees -the Human Rights Violations Committee, the Committee on
Amnesty and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation of Victims-were
established to fulfill the goals of the Commission. As noted in Chapter 1,
concepts contained in the Act, such the terms ‗human rights violations‘,
‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘ were the subject of intense debate and deep
contestation, and Commisioners had to put up with the challenge of putting
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them into actual practice.175 The implications of these terms are a central aspect
of analysis in this thesis. How could this language of ‗victims‘ and
‗perpetrators‘ have impinged on the goal of reconciliation that the mandate had
established? Before this question is taken into account and an examination of
the critiques to the TRC and the media are outlined, the content of the main
language of the Commission needs to be lay out.
Terminology of the TRC
 Violations of Human Rights
The task of investigating and condemning actions that the Act identified
as violations of human rights posed some important challenges to the
Commission. Commissioners argued that the lack of clarity of some of the
terminology in the Act put limitations in their work. A gross violation of human
right was one such term. The Act established the following definition:
―…‘gross violation of human rights‘ means the violation of human rights
through-(a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment of any
person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command
or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which
emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the
period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and
the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or
ordered, by any person acting with a political motive (section 1(1)(ix).‖
176

Commissioners argued that the Act could have been more precise or clearer in
this area.177 For instance, determining what acts had a clearly ‗political motive‘
was difficult to assess. They said that it was hard to establish the most

175

TRC Final Report 1, supra note 164, at 58
TRC Final Report 1, supra note 164, at 60
177
TRC Final Report 1, supra note 164, at 60
176

68

appropriate criteria for classifying an action as strictly political because of the
very nature of apartheid: ―Given the complexity of the conflicts that occurred in
the past and the fact that the enforcement of apartheid legislation affected every
sphere of society, the political nature of specific acts was hard to define.‖178
Hence, one of the most urgent tasks on the agenda of the Commission was to
resolve what constituted a politically motivated act and what did not.
Eventually, the Commission decided to narrow the understanding of political
acts down to ―…any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or
procurement to commit an act‖, and it was a decision largely informed by the
Noorgard Principles.179 These principles, which were elaborated by the
president of the European Commission on Human Rights Carl Aage Norgaard
at the time of the Namibian settlement in 1978,180 included the following
conditions to determine the political nature of an act:
―the motive of the person who committed the act; the context in which
the act took place; the legal and factual nature of the act; the object of the
act; whether the act was carried out on the orders of a body of which the
perpetrator was a member; and the closeness of the connection between
the act and the objective pursued.‖181
As much as the definition of human rights violations posed some challenges to
the Commission, so did the ‗victim/perpetrator‘ binary.
 Victims & Perpetrators
The subjects of the Commission, as stated in the language of the Act,
were victims and perpetrators of the actions that constituted gross violations of
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human rights. Nevertheless, Commissioners recognized that the terms victims
and perpetrators had relevant limitations and problematic paradoxes. In this
respect, Borer has elaborated extensively on the issues attached to the
somewhat simplistic ‗victim/perpetrator‘ binary. She has said that in reality,
differences between these two groups were not necessarily as clear-cut, and that
the ―homogeneity that [was] often assumed to individuals within each group
[has been] overstated.‖182 In what concerns to the term ‗victims‘, at the most
basic level, they were those individuals against whom any of the violations
were committed.183 If a person had undergone torture or persecution during the
time period established in the Act, then that person could come forward and
testify to the Commission. However, this concept did not necessarily match the
perceptions or the ideas of those who were labeled as such. The TRC Report
states that ―…many described as victims might better be described, and indeed,
might prefer to be described as survivors.‖184 Particularly, some of those who
actively fought in the struggle against apartheid felt uncomfortable with the
‗victim‘ label.
In spite of its issues, the Commission ended up applying the term of
victim as it was handed down to it by the mandate, limiting it even further to a
closed-list of persons who could qualify for compensation. Only individuals
who approached the Commission and fit the category of victim or those who
did so on behalf of other victims, or if their names came up during the amnesty
182
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process were included in the closed-list of victims.185 The issues that this
particular term engendered were (and have been) as much the subject of
criticism of the TRC‘s work as were the implications of the concept of
‗perpetrator‘.
Problematic as the term was, the Commission used the term ‗perpetrator‘
when referring to those who could be held accountable for committing any
violation of human rights motivated for political reasons. By mandate, the
Commission had to identify all the persons who perpetrated human rights
abuses with an exclusively political aim regardless of their backgrounds.
Commissioners admitted that they used this term with unease. The label
‗perpetrator‘ by itself made no distinction of context or the backdrop against
which some actions were committed in the first place.186 In fact, this was one of
the primary reasons why the ANC expressed discomfort with the work of the
TRC: ―At the core of the ANC‘s anger and disagreement with the TRC was the
government‘s perception that the TRC was not properly distinguishing between
the morality of the violence perpetrated by the state versus the that of
perpetrators fighting against the state.‖187 According to the ANC, in trying to
stay neutral when allocating responsibility, the TRC risked failing to
acknowledge the structural factors that motivated the engagement in violent
struggle on the part of the liberation movements. The Commission‘s response to
this challenge was that even for just causes, unjust deeds might be carried
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out.188 Nevertheless, a perception of overall failure to acknowledge the bigger
picture of apartheid, and the alleged repercussions of such failure on race
relations specifically, has given substance to the critiques of the TRC which will
be discussed in the next pages.
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The TRC and Race
Race, the most distinguishable element of apartheid, was a complex
subject for the TRC to grapple with. Due to decades of racial classification and
segregation, race relations in South Africa were under much strain after the
1994 elections. The task of improving this state of affairs seemed immediate,
and in many ways the TRC appeared as one mechanism that would help
overcome the racist legacy of apartheid. Nevertheless, people‘s views and the
sentiments about the work of the Commission and its handling of the race issue
have been rather varied. For instance, according to Desmond Tutu, some people
perceived that the truth-telling process that the Commission initiated was in
fact detrimental to the state of race relations in the country and the greater goal
of reconciliation.189 In the foreword of the final report of the TRC, Tutu
commented on this perception: ―Some have been upset by the suggestion that
the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission could have resulted in
making people angrier and race relations more difficult, as indicated by a recent
survey.‖190 In this respect, scholars like Mahmood Mamdani and Brandon
Hamber, among others, have put forward arguments that aim to prove how the
limitations of the TRC have had an impact on reconciliation and racial relations
in South Africa.
Mamdani has argued that the TRC‘s scope of work was too narrow and
that for this reason, it did not strike at the core issues of apartheid, which were
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mainly structural. In failing to include ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid -those who
did not necessarily engage in human rights violations considered by the
Commission but still bore some responsibility- and the large majority of
victims, he says, reconciliation was impinged.191 In more direct reference to the
issue of racism, Brandon Hamber says, ―Through the failure of the TRC to
address structural issues, it was inevitable that in the post-TRC period, the
inequalities of the past and their racial flavor would loom large-as indeed they
do.‖192 Thus, racial relations remain largely problematic today. Scholars like
James Gibson, however propose an alternative view and consider that the TRC
fulfilled its role dutifully and that the Commission‘s work did in fact contribute
to improving racial relations.193 Before this debate is analyzed in detail,
however, it is important to note that if there is agreement that the TRC had to
lay the groundwork for ‗reconciliation and national unity‘,194

there is still

disagreement over what reconciliation should entail. In effect, different
understandings of reconciliation complicate views of the impact of the TRC on
racism in South Africa. Whether the Commission could in any way be held
responsible for either deteriorated or improved race relations is also a function
of what concept of reconciliation one is looking at. For this thesis though, the
aspect of reconciliation that will figure more prominently is that of racial
reconciliation. Given that apartheid sought division through racism, then
191
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reconciliation, as Gibson suggests, must happen among these races.
Interestingly, by mandate the Commission could not deal with racism per se,
even though it was the founding ideology of the system of apartheid.
The scope of human rights violations in the TRC‘s mandate limited the
Commission in its treatment of racism. Commissioners argued that that they
had to abide by the terms of inquiry that their mandate delineated, terms that in
some ways ruled out attempting to denounce or solve purely racist issues. 195 In
the Commission‘s report, the recognition of this limitation is made explicit in
several instances. Under the topic of ‗Racism‘, Commissioners explained how
they were constrained to act when people brought forward problems with
racism.196 For instance, on several occasions, individuals were victims of racist
attacks at the hands of people who were not necessarily tied to a particular
political organization or political ideology. Yet, the Commission could not take
these cases into consideration because the Act only took issue with abuses that
had a specific political intent or motif. The final report notes: ―Although racism
was at the heart of the South African political order, and although such cases
were clearly a violation of a victim‘s rights, such violations did not fall within
the Commission‘s work.‖197 At the same time, racism was taken into account in
those cases that seemed to fall under the purview of the mandate of the
Commission, as it was with the cases where racism and political ideology were
closely intertwined: ―Instances where racism was used to mobilize people
through a political organization as part of their commitment to a political
195
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struggle or where racism was used by a political organization to incite other to
violence.‖198 Killings of white farmers by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) or
the ANC, and violence against Blacks by right-wing organizations, were some
examples of such instances when racism was visibly guiding political actions.199
In general though, Tutu reaffirmed that racism was the common element of the
human rights violations that the Commission scrutinized. In fact, he said that
the majority of those who perpetrated these violations were defending
apartheid.200 Madeleine Fullard and Nahla Valji, however, believe that much
more could have been done to deal with the race problem of apartheid by the
TRC. They argue that the Commission failed to address the issue of racism in its
work properly, and that in doing so an opportunity was missed to improve the
state of race relations in South Africa.201 James Gibson, however, asserts that the
Commission‘s approach to racism was appropriate and that it actually fostered
better racial relations today.
Gibson has done quantitative analysis to demonstrate that TRC played
an enabling role that eased racial tensions and helped lay the groundwork for
improved racial relations in contemporary South Africa. In his view, an
important aspect of the reconciliation that the TRC was meant to bring about
was racial reconciliation.202 If apartheid divided people along racial categories
and exacerbated hostilities among these clearly defined racial groups, then
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logically reconciliation must happen primarily between these groups. ―In South
Africa,‖ says Gibson, ―the groups that must reconcile are the four main racial
groups in the country-whites, Africans, Coloured people, and South Africans of
Asian origin.‖203 Ideally, if reconciliation has been achieved, these groups
should see and treat each other as equal and with respect and dignity.

204

In

theory, Gibson has argued a minimization of racial animosities would entail
higher levels of interaction among people from different races, as well as more
communication coupled with greater understanding and acceptance of distinct
racial groups. If these elements are present, they would ultimately lead to an
embrace of racial diversity and multiculturalism.

205

In his analysis, Gibson has

contended that the nature of the work of the TRC enabled the emergence of
these attitudes, thus contributing to racial reconciliation.
Gibson has argued that the non-biased, even-handed treatment of the
gross violations of human rights that the TRC dealt with fostered racial
reconciliation. In his view, the fact that the Commission acknowledged that
people from every side perpetrated violations during the struggle against
apartheid is what helped to defy racial boundaries. In other words, if what most
people knew about apartheid was what the ‗other‘ had done, the Commission
challenged people‘s prejudices by virtue of its work. He says, ―To get South
Africans to change their attitudes toward those of other racial groups, it is
essential that the cognitive basis of racial beliefs be shaken up… How might the
truth and reconciliation process have created this dissonance? Perhaps the most
203
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important lesson of the TRC was that both sides in the struggle did horrible
things.‖206 According to Gibson, the fact that the violations committed by the
South African Police Force and the ANC were equally condemned was a step
forward in demystifying ideas of those in different racial groups bringing
people closer together.
Similarly, the Commission had to take into account that as much as there
were perpetrators of gross violations of human rights in every group, there
were also victims on every side. In relation to this, Commissioners explain that
they had to apply an even-handed treatment to victims of human rights
violations due to the terms of the founding Act. According to the report: ―The
Commission was obliged by statute to deal even-handedly with all victims. Its
actions when dealing with individual victims were guided, amongst other
things, by the principle that ‗victims shall be treated equally without
discrimination of any kind‘ (section 11 (b)). In so doing, it acknowledged the
tragedy of human suffering wherever it occurred.‖207 In Gibson‘s view, it is
precisely this neutral approach to human rights violations that has increased
the likelihood of lasting reconciliation because it has given Blacks and whites
the chance to see a more accurate picture of the reality of apartheid. 208 Other
scholars, however, have looked at the TRC‘s alleged neutrality towards the
violations it handled with unease, and have challenged the argument that the
Commission‘s approach was the most appropriate one.
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Critics like Valji and Fullard argue that the TRC downplayed the role of
racism in understanding the violations of human rights that came under the
purview of its work. According to Valji, Commissioners treated racism and
politics separately rather than as strongly related. She says that race was only
explicitly addressed in the TRC process when it was used as a mobilizing tool
of a political organization, which is a fair statement in light of Tutu‘s
recognition of the instances when race came up in the work of the Commission
as an issue to be dealt with. Valji argues that this approach to race is
problematic because it served to disguise essentially racist acts behind the
‗political‘ label.209 Similarly, Fullard considers that political and ideological
affiliations mattered more to the TRC than people‘s racial identities and how
these identities affected their lives.210 She says, ―Race and racism were decentered as a critical interrogational framework for the TRC, along with several
other key constitutive elements of the parameters of apartheid, including class,
gender and ethnicity.‖211 Furthermore, Valji argues that throughout the process
victims were forced to concentrate on the most important details of their stories
and

were

discouraged

from

narrating

everyday

events

of

racial

discrimination.212 In a similar line, Willhelm Verdoolaege states: ―Stories were
circumscribed and crafted through a variety of means, including pre-rehearsing
of those who were to tell their stories publicly, the controlling of testimonies in
209
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the public arena using uniform questions and interruptions where witnesses
strayed from expected testimony into unanticipated topics.‖213 As for the report,
the topic of racism is minimally discussed and limited to a couple of pages.
Posel says that racism figures more ―as an answer, and not a question [...]
Racism simply exists. Overall, there is little sense of interconnectedness of
racism and other divides in the society.‖214 In Mamdani‘s view, the categories of
‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘ misrepresented the reality of apartheid.
Mamdani has pointed out that the truth that came out of the Commission
did not mirror the realities of a large number of South Africans that lived under
apartheid. He has said that the TRC had its own version of truth, reducing it to
the voices of perpetrators and victims that took part in the process. 215 Critical of
these definitions and the concept of gross violation of human rights that was
established, he makes the comparison between the Gulag and the force
removals of apartheid, after which he adds: ―[The] 3.5 million victims comprise
faceless communities, not individual activists. They constitute a social
catastrophe, not merely a political dilemma…Why, then, did the TRC not
include these people as ‗victims‘?‖216 Essentially, he is saying that the reduction
of victims to those who suffered politically motivated human rights violations
such as torture or persecution excluded the large number of victims of
apartheid laws from the TRC process. Although many Blacks might not have
213
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been suffered the violations that the Commission investigated, their lives were
severely circumscribed by the norms of the racist regime. In the same manner,
not all whites perpetrated the acts that the Commission oversaw, but they still
benefited from the racist underpinnings of the regime. These ‗beneficiaries‘, as
Mamdani calls them, were not brought to account by the Commission because
their responsibility was not formally recognized in the mandate. In his view,
these conceptual limitations had a direct negative effect on reconciliation.
The omissions of the TRC could have had the effect of limiting racial
reconciliation and could account for race relations that remain strained in South
Africa today. According to Fullard, after the TRC, reconciliation is still a largely
unfulfilled goal. She thinks that the language that the TRC used, such as the
term ‗political‘ act or the ‗victims and perpetrators‘ binary that the Commission
dealt with, had the effect of displacing race and racial identity from
understandings of the violence of the past and the present.217 Valji also
considers that the process that led to the formation of the TRC could have
resulted in a rather limited, ‗superficial‘ reconciliation. In disengaging from a
more open discussion of how racism factored into the violations of human
rights under the scrutiny of the Commission, the TRC―…has left many of the
structures of inequality intact and unaddressed and has suppressed dialogue on
the persistence of racism in the new South Africa.‖218 At a general level, the
psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that truth commissions risk
becoming ―…merely sites of symbolic apology and reconciliation that then
217
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stands as a substitute or excuse for actual and substantive transformation.‖219
In South Africa, the high levels of urban segregation and the 2008 xenophobic
attacks are possible evidences of the lack of significant change that GobodoMadikizela refers to. In the same manner, Hamber says that there is a ‗silencing‘
about how race in the present is still the defining element of social
relationships.220 Valji attributes this silencing to the suppression of a more open
dialogue about the racism of apartheid during the TRC.221 At the same time,
Fullard acknowledges that as much as the work of the TRC could be blamed for
still problematic race relations in contemporary South Africa, this work was
inevitably a function of the mandate that established the TRC in the first
place.222
If by any measure the TRC failed to deal with race more appropriately,
the effect of the mandate that established the Commission should be analyzed.
Fullard note that in the language of the Act there is no reference to ‗apartheid‘,
‗racism‘ or ‗race‘. Instead, a call to work for a future in which the rights of
people are upheld irrespective of their color, gender, and so on is made.223
Hence, Fullard argues that the omission of the issue of race begins with the very
founding document of the TRC. She says, ―It could be argued that the
legislation, which is quite literally the constitutive act of the TRC, decenters race
through the use of descriptors that render the conflicts of the past unspecific
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and all-encompassing.‖224 She adds that the TRC‘s purpose, which emanated
from the Act, could have inevitably meant that it had to suppress sites of
potential conflict such as discussions on race; ―The TRC was […] an instrument
of national unity and a project of national (re) construction, that involved
silencing of conflict and concealment of the continuities of injustice from past to
present, in order to ‗imagine‘ the new nation.‖225 The Commission had to build
a new narrative that would necessarily preclude the kind of language and
approach that would put race at the center of the truth telling process;
―[Racism] had to be excluded from [the TRC‘s] interrogational framework and
the new values of constitutionalism and citizenship of the new South Africa
inscribed accordingly.‖226 However, it must be noted that the TRC did move
beyond the boundaries of its mandate and, in an innovative move, devised a
series of institutional hearings to examine the issues that critics think were left
largely unattended.
Institutional hearings
Media, business, religious, legal and health sectors among others were all
brought together under the TRC‘s official attempt to address the structural
framework of apartheid and disclose the role of these institutions in sustaining
or defying the system. This was an important development in the truth-telling
process because the Commission departed from its mandate to have an even
deeper enquiry into the past. The Commission did not need to establish these
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hearings since its mandate did not require so. Nevertheless, Commissioners
recognized that the role of institutions as ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid was being
neglected in the process.227 For this reason, their attempt to fix that aspect was
commendable. In Fullard‘s view, however, these hearings evidence how the
TRC process as a whole dangerously disregarded the relevance of racism. She
refers to these hearings by saying,
―They [hearings] were the place in the TRC where the questions of race
and racism were most overtly considered and debated-where race was
‗admitted‘ into official TRC regard…These hearings stood in awkward
discontinuity with the amnesty hearings, where, as indicated above,
racism was excluded as a legitimate political objective.‖228
It remains true as well that discussing or addressing every aspect of the
apartheid past was a daunting task, especially when the kind of issues that
characterized apartheid continued to be felt even within the Commission. The
involvement of the media, for instance, is a good case in which to examine the
contradictions and shortcomings of the overall process of transitional justice. A
‗beneficiary‘ of apartheid itself, media outlets strove to have a positive role
throughout the life of the TRC. At the same time, they had to come to terms
with the fact that they were themselves at times the subjects with which the
Commission was not properly dealing with. For these reasons, an exploration of
the different views on the role of the media within the process is warranted.
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The TRC and Media
The media, meaning newspapers, radio stations and television agencies,
were key actors of the transitional justice process that South Africa embarked
upon in 1996. Although the TRC was the cornerstone of this process, it was not
alone in the pursuit of ‗national unity and reconciliation‘ that the 1995
Parliamentary Act called for.229 The media delivered the information that came
out of the TRC hearings with the intent of engaging the rest of society in the
process. Thereby, the Commission has said that the media helped to enhance
the public nature of the process, in line with what the Act had envisioned.230
Furthermore, the TRC Report has commended the fact that the accounts of
victims and perpetrators effectively reached a large audience even beyond
South Africa:
―People saw, for example, a former security police officer demonstrating
his torture techniques. They saw weeping men and women asking for the
truth about their missing loved ones. The media also helped generate
public debate on central aspects of South Africa‘s past and to raise the
level of historical awareness.‖231
Even as the process was unfolding, some commentators made the claim that the
success of the TRC lay with the media.232 Nevertheless, while expectations
about their involvement in the process ran high, criticism about their work soon
began to emerge. Particularly, at a 1997 conference titled ―Reporting the Truth
Commission‖ in which journalists, editors and guests with varied expertise
229
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gathered to discuss their role in the TRC, a number of concerns about the way
media outlets were reporting the hearings were raised.233 Eventually, some of
these concerns would become the foundation of the main criticisms about the
media‘s involvement in the TRC.
From the start of the TRC process, journalists showed committed
engagement with the task of covering the hearings of the Commission, while
they also demonstrated concern for a number of dilemmas. The Media
Monitoring Group (MMG) research study about the media‘s coverage of the
TRC between two different periods –April 1996 to February 1997 and March to
September

1997

–

confirms

that

―…the

media

covered

the

TRC

comprehensively, particularly with regard to specific individual and group
testimonies, issues of personal and/or political reconciliation, views of different
political groups on the TRC, and the broad effectiveness of the Commission.‖234
Antjie Krog, an Afrikaner journalist who followed the work of the Commission
and wrote about it extensively, depicts the deep level of awareness of
journalists who were covering it. At a media workshop for those reporting on
the hearings, she points out at some important questions that journalists were
dealing with:
―A workshop is organized for journalists who will be covering the Truth
Commission and their immediate editors…Various topics are discussed:
how can exhaustion be prevented? How can viewers, listeners, and
readers be involved? Should Truth Commission stories be confined to a
233
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special page? Won‘t people just skip over this section? How can we see
to it that the past becomes front-page news? No newspaper has the
means to cover the commission full-time-will television be able to
broadcast the hearings daily so that people can follow them from their
offices?
What is the role of radio with its access to all the language groups and
impoverished communities? And do all eleven official languages have
the words needed to cover the commission? (...).‖235
These questions are evidence that journalists knew well that covering the
Commission had complexities that needed to be addressed. Even so, critics
have pointed out that the media‘s involvement was flawed and weak in
different ways.
In a similar vein to those who argue that the TRC downplayed the
impact that apartheid had on the lives of far more people than those who were
directly involved in the hearings, some people also think that media outlets
mirrored this flaw and missed an opportunity to rectify the shortcomings of the
truth-telling process. Firstly, people argue that the ‗truth‘ that came out of the
Commission was taken as such -unchallenged and unquestioned- and delivered
to the rest of society without a critical filter.236 As a result, in the same way that
some people have suggested that the TRC narrowed down the conflict to a
small number of victims and perpetrators, others have said that the media
failed to portray the complexity of both the apartheid regime and the liberation
struggle that brought it down.237 In other words, they limited their work to
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reflecting the process rather than challenging it.238 A point for consideration is
that the media was in a rather odd position within the process, a consequence of
what has been described as the media‘s ‗symbiotic‘ relationship with the
TRC.239A closer look to the debate deems necessary.
The media utilized the same concepts and ideas that the Commission
adopted from the Act at the expense of much needed discussion and criticism
about them. For instance, Anthea Garman thinks that reporters borrowed the
same ‗victim/perpetrator‘ dichotomy that the TRC used in order to facilitate the
framing of the information; ―Both the TRC and the media have been guilty of
seeking out those who fit into these two neat categories so that the story is easy
to relate and fits a neat guilty-innocent dichotomy.‖240 Furthermore, Brandon
Hamber echoes the argument of a number of people who have said that the
media did not disclose anything new other than what the TRC managed to
gather at the hearings.241 He comments, ―…The media reflecting the truths
revealed by the TRC should not be undermined, but it is unlikely that truth
alone will be sufficient to change the ingrained apartheid mindset.‖242 The fact
that racism was minimally mentioned as an explanatory variable of the events
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that the media reported on is unsettling to critics of their work.243 For instance,
in the same MMG research study that corroborates that the media covered the
Commission, the lacked of contextual analysis of this coverage is noted,
particularly the aspect of racial segregation:
―[…] Stories were largely covered without any direct reference to race
and racism. While the coverage often related to individual incidents or
sets of incidents, these were very seldom described in racial terms.
Instead, the media preferred to label incidents as ―human rights abuses‖
or ―politically motivated crimes‖, thereby downplaying the racial
element…‖244
The study makes the observation that the omission of racism from these reports
has the problematic implication of undermining the relevance of race to
understand the past in South Africa and the cases that the Commission dealt
with:
―While there is no doubt that the victims of repression under apartheid
were indeed the victims of gross human rights abuses, it is also clear that
many such incidents were informed by societal and institutional racism.
While these acts may have been committed under the influence of a
certain political ideology and could thus be regarded as political, the
media has been complicit in denying the essential racist rationale
involved. Much of the coverage simply ignored the racially-motivated
context altogether.‖245
Overall, the main point of concern here is the apparent disregard of context,
and in this case the way reporting was done is relevant.
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Through their reporting, some people think that the media furthered the
omission of the wider picture of apartheid. In limiting their work to passing on
the information of the human rights violations and the amnesty hearings to the
public without a proper framework, they did not reflect the larger complexities
of apartheid.246 Bird and Garda find it problematic that stories mostly focused
on certain aspects of people‘s accounts, leaving out other important aspects that
could have provided some background to understand these accounts; ―Most
media reporters would quote extensively from a survivor‘s testimony,
especially of their suffering, but fail to report on the survivor‘s life afterwards
or on their demands or requests from the commission.‖ 247 For this reason, the
large numbers of people who were affected and benefited by apartheid fell
outside of the frame of reportage of media outlets. At a conference in Cape
Town titled ―Reporting the Truth Commission‖, journalist Tony Weaver
highlighted that the real object of reconciliation was among victims and the
beneficiaries of the apartheid system, an assertion that echoes Mahmood
Mamdani‘s main argument.248 But instead, media limited their coverage to high
profile cases.249 In fact, some have suggested that the media did not represent
properly those who were against the truth-telling process because they abided
by this process without hesitance.250 This argument puts the spotlight on a key
aspect of the media‘s involvement in the TRC, which has to do with the
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ambivalent relationship and position of certain media outlets during apartheid
and in transitional justice process.
The involvement of the media in the TRC process, although perceived as
fundamentally necessary for the success of this process, was also problematic
and ambivalent. On the one hand, the media were seeing as allies of the
transitional justice process. TRC deputy chairperson Alex Boraine has said,
―The TRC owes a huge debt to the media of South Africa. Without
coverage in newspapers and magazines and without the account of
proceedings on TV screens and without the voice of the TRC being
beamed through radio across the land, its work would be disadvantaged
and immeasurably poorer.‖251
On the other hand, media workers also had to come to terms with their own
roles and their mixed records of victimhood and culpability throughout
apartheid. Hence, it was particularly difficult for journalists to report on a
process of which they themselves were part of at different levels:
―Journalists have found themselves being pulled into the events being
covered. Some were victims of human rights abuses themselves, some
were perpetrators; some found themselves implicated as part of the
group who benefited from apartheid. Some just found the ‗endless
repetition of horror‘…psychologically overwhelming.”252
Antjie Krog says that learning about the atrocities that members of her
Afrikaner ancestry committed was a traumatic event.253Also, in her depictions
of the issues that media members had to grapple with when reporting the
Commission, she portrays the ambivalent position in which many journalists
found themselves in. At one particular instance at a TRC workshop for the
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media, Krog highlights the comments of two journalists –one from the Sowetan,
whose readership was and still is mainly Black, and Beeld, a distinctively
Afrikaaner newspaper- which offer a clear picture of the difficult stance of the
media within the TRC:
―By late afternoon we are discussing how you keep your own past out
your reporting. The journalist from the Sowetan stands up: ―My
newspaper‘s position is that it has actually always done TRC-type stories
and will not make any special effort to cover the commission.‖
Willem Pretorious of Beeld is on his feet. ―In the army, I was sent to cut
off Radio Freedom‘s cables and take them off the air. What does that
make me? Can I-or can I not-report on the Truth Commission?‖254
Nevertheless, to some people the complex relationship between the media and
the TRC did not rule out the possibility of being more autonomous in the
process. Critics have argued that journalists could have still played a better or
more effective role by ―disentangling themselves from their ‗symbiotic‘
relationship with the Commission‖.255 In failing to do so, some people believe
that the media did not take on the many issues surrounding the TRC. Yet, the
extent to which the ambivalent position of the media had any impact in the
work they carried out throughout the transitional justice process should still be
noted. Nowhere was the relevance of this position as obvious as it was during
the TRC institutional hearings.
The Media in the TRC institutional hearings
The media hearings, as part of the number of other hearings in which the
TRC examined the role of institutions during apartheid, disclosed the many
254
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ways in which media outlets could have been responsible for the human rights
violations that took place in the past. These hearings are important not only
because they show evidence of the complexity of media‘s involvement in the
TRC process. The hearings challenge criticism directed at the Commission and
the media that blames them for excluding large numbers of people from the
process and undermining the relevance of race and racism during apartheid.
The real value of these hearings is that clear evidence of how the media
establishment fulfilled a role in supporting the apartheid system - often in
subtle ways but still relevant ones - and perpetuating racism is brought to
forefront.
Previous knowledge of the fact that the media had a an incriminatory
role in supporting the apartheid system is evident from the decision of holding
the hearings at the offices of the South African Broadcasting Agency (SABC),
later described in the TRC Report as ―…a blatantly pro-government and
apartheid institution.‖256 At the hearings, the Commission found that for the
most part, the media ―sanctioned‖ apartheid in various ways. Yet, some media
outlets bore far more responsibility than others. For instance, the Commission
found that by misrepresenting the human rights violations of the government,
the Afrikaans press was particularly liable for instigating apartheid‘s prejudice.
―The Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the
superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of
people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected
the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish
reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long
256
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history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor
ones.‖257
In fact, the Commission declared that the Afrikaans media was at times directly
responsible for providing support to the government‘s security forces.258 On the
part of the English media, the Commission accused them for establishing a
policy of appeasement towards the state, which encouraged a large measure of
self-censorship that would not allow condemnation of government‘s
violations.259 Most prominently, the Commission determined that the SABC
was ―a tool of government.‖260 The interviews that senior broadcasts Hendrik
and Christel Bussiek carried out with SABC workers helped to confirm that the
broadcasting agency was closely related to the apartheid state. Furthermore,
research done by Professor John van Zyl found that the SABC‘s coverage
‗normalized‘ apartheid‘s daily occurrences:
―Content analysis by Professor John van Zyl over a period of sixteen
years revealed a distinct bias at the SABC. According to his analysis,
news bulletins maintained and cultivated a mindset amongst white
viewers that apartheid was natural and inevitable. SABC programming,
he found, was instrumental in cultivating a ―war psychosis‖, which in
turn created an environment in which human rights abuses could take
place.‖261
At the same time, the Commission recognized that as much as media
propaganda contributed to the status quo, the liberation forces also had a stake
in the perpetuation and intensification of violent conflict. For this reason,
accusations from the South African Defense Force (SADF) about the role of
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Radio Freedom –the ANC‘s main media outlet- in instigating violence were
taken up by the TRC. Nevertheless, the Commission made a sharp distinction
about the way Radio Freedom could have enhanced the climate of violence.
Commissioners reached to the conclusion that it is implausible to prove how
radio broadcasts alone were responsible ―…for the large number of incidents of
gross human rights violations recorded in the SADF document, particularly as
nobody was forced to tune in and listen to Radio Freedom.‖262 In a similar
manner, even though racism was inserted into the legal system, the
Commission found that some media establishments actively pursued racist
actions beyond the parameters of law.
Although many laws were put in place to implement the racist
foundations of the apartheid regime and also to restrict the agency of the media
to challenge the system, the Commission found evidence of high levels of
racism within media institutions that make them accountable. The state was
active in its pursuit of curtailing media‘s freedom via laws that inevitably
enhanced racial injustices. At the same time, Commissioners declared: ―It
would seem, however, that discrimination went way beyond what was
required by apartheid legislation. Individual testimony to the Commission
confirmed this, validating the allegations made by Black journalists.‖263 In fact,
Black journalists manifested that racism took on different forms but was everpresent. For instance, they described that a selective approach to news stories
was commonplace. This was done by questioning the legitimacy of a Black
262
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journalist‘s story or by giving a higher priority to stories that involved whites,
even though those that involved Blacks were more relevant.264 In addition, they
claimed that they had fewer opportunities for training or promotion, and they
were penalized if they missed work days to go to a march while whites would
not.265 These issues show proof that the concerns which journalists expressed at
the start of the TRC process were well-founded. The media would in fact be
challenged in their coverage work particularly by virtue of their position during
apartheid.
This chapter has shown that the work of the TRC and the media had
limitations that, in the view of some critics, carried negative implications.
Specifically, the terminology of the Commission excluded a large portion of the
population that either suffered or benefited from the regime. The lack of
recognition of the thousands of victims of apartheid laws and the many
individuals and institutions which, even though did not perpetrate the number
of ‗violations of human rights‘ that figured in the Commission‘s mandate but
still advantaged from it, may have undermined the possibility of establishing
an all-encompassing process of reconciliation. Furthermore, the minimal
reference about how racism was the motivating element of the human rights
violations under scrutiny by the TRC and the media may have prevented much
needed challenge and discussion about the racist attitudes that characterized
the past. The ways in which these problematic limitations impact contemporary
race relations in South Africa will be the subject of the next chapter.
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4. Race in Post-apartheid South Africa:
The Struggle against the Past

97

F

ifteen years after the end of apartheid, assessing official efforts
aimed at overcoming the divisive legacy of the racist regime in

South Africa seems appropriate. An analysis of the impact of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the media‘s role in disseminating this
impact during the transition to democracy is now becoming possible because
the passing of time allows for retrospective analysis. The effect of these two key
actors of the transitional justice process can now be measured against the
background of contemporary issues. In this regard, it is important to keep in
mind that the end of apartheid did not usher in the beginning of a non-racial
society in South Africa. To a much lesser degree, arguably, race and racism
continue to be part of the social fabric of South African society in many ways.
Often, newspaper headlines bring attention to particular instances that
reveal the still present racial tensions in the country. For instance, in November
of 2010, the comments of Anneli Botes, a well-known Afrikaner novelist,
sparked controversy over the level of racism in society. Her public assertion of
her dislike of Black people stirred a round of debate about unspoken racist
sentiments that people still harbored.266 In an interview with Rapport
newspaper, she was asked who the people the she dislikes the most are. Her
reply was blunt: ―Black people.‖ She continued by saying, ―In my daily life,
there's no one else that I feel threatened by except black people. If a courier
comes to my door and he's white, coloured or Indian, I'd have no problem
inviting him in for a glass of water. But I would feel threatened by a black
266

Groenewald, Yolandi. “Author Annelie Botes stands by racist comments”. Mail&Guardian, 26
November 2010.

98

man.‖267 Interestingly, as much as many condemned and labeled the writer‘s
sentiments as racist, there were also people who praised her for speaking
openly about what others would not dare to express.268 It is these types of
seemingly ordinary incidents that bring South Africa back to revealing
discussions about apartheid‘s legacy. People have argued, for instance, that the
2008 xenophobic attacks, in which foreigners and South Africans alike were
victims of violent attacks in urban townships, are a continuation of the recent
history of racial violence, or that the generally high level of crime has its origin
in the inequality that the apartheid regime created through racial segregation.269
For these reasons, attempts to measure the state of race relations in South Africa
in a more rigorous, scientific manner have emerged, rendering disparate
results. For instance, in 2000 and 2001, the scholar James Gibson conducted
research on the impact of the TRC on racial reconciliation in the country, and he
concluded that a high degree of interracial reconciliation appears to have been
achieved.270 However, the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) -by
the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) which has conducted an annual
survey since 2003- has shown that levels of interaction among people of
different races have remained consistently low.271 Although the disparity of the
findings could be attributed to different periods of time in which the research
267
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studies were administered, a closer look to the analyses of the data can provide
important insights.
James Gibson’s Approach
If reconciliation is understood as the improvement of racial relations,
says James Gibson, South Africa has made significant progress. In his view,
reconciliation in South Africa goes beyond the relationship between victims and
perpetrators of the human rights violations of apartheid, and it encompasses
those who were ―masters and slaves‖ within the racial system.272 Essentially, he
says that reconciliation means historically divided racial groups ―getting along
better; a diminution of racial animosities.‖273 Therefore, the goal of
reconciliation is that South Africans of different races learn to treat each other as
equals who are worthy of respect.―Consequently,‖ he says, ―a ‗reconciled‘
South African is one who: eschews racial stereotyping [and] treats people
respectfully, as individuals, and not as members of a racial group (…).‖274 This
type of scenario would be the by-product of more interracial communication,
greater empathy and embracement of multiculturalism and diversity. 275 Hence,
Gibson designed his work along these parameters.
The results of Gibson‘s survey indicate that reconciliation in South Africa
has been consolidated, an outcome in his view of the TRC. His survey, which
was administered in 2000 and 2001, concludes that about 44% of the population
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is ―at least somewhat reconciled.‖276 He suggests that given that no similar
research work had been done before this survey, it is fair to assume that
reconciliation in previous years and certainly throughout apartheid was
remarkably lower than 44%. This leads him to make the following assertion:
―That nearly one-half of the South African population expresses some degree of
reconciliation in less than a decade after the formal demise of apartheid
represents, from my perspective, an unexpectedly high level of reconciliation.
Reconciliation seems to have made inroads into a sizable portion of the South
African population.‖277 He specifically attributes what he sees as an
improvement in racial relations to the work of the TRC. Moreover, he says, no
evidence indicates that the truth of the Commission harmed the goal of
reconciliation.278 On the contrary, he argues, the findings demonstrate ―that
truth and reconciliation do indeed go together and are compatible with the
view that the collective memory produced by the truth and reconciliation
process contributes to levels of reconciliation.‖279 Certainly though, this
conclusion ignores other findings in the analysis which are worth noting, such
as that only 33% of Africans agreed that they were ―somewhat reconciled‖
against the larger 56% and 59% of whites and Coloured people respectively.280
Gibson also recognizes some limitations when trying to establish causality.
However, he concludes that the more people accept the process of the TRC, the
more likely that they will feel reconciled with people from other racial groups.
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Gibson argues that the TRC‘s success lay in the fact that it did not make
distinctions between individuals who committed gross violations of human
rights during apartheid. In contrast to this thesis‘ main hypothesis, –that the
TRC‘s overall even-handedness contributed to race relations that remain
problematic in South Africa- he proposes that Commission‘s equal treatment of
guilt and responsibility could be the reason why his survey shows positive
results. Had the TRC allocated all the blame on one side, he says, it would have
been much less unlikely to achieve meaningful reconciliation. 281 Although
many people disagree with the Commission‘s ‗even-handedness‘, Gibson
regards it as the ideal approach to violations of human rights. In the TRC
report, Commissioners explain that this approach was informed by standards of
international law which strictly prohibit acts such as torture or the killing of
civilians. In light of this view, even those who might have justly fought against
the apartheid regime could have been responsible for carrying out acts that
could not, under any circumstances, be regarded as ―morally or legally
legitimate.‖282 Hence, the Commission acknowledged that human rights
violations were committed by either state or non-state actors.283 Gibson
considers that this acknowledgment, ―that both sides in the struggle [whites
and Blacks] did horrible things‖, is perhaps the TRC‘s most important lesson.284
Thanks to this approach, he argues, whites could realize how the system that
benefited them was ―less than noble‖ and that those who actively opposed it
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were ―less radically evil.‖285 Similarly, Blacks were also given a chance to
change their attitudes towards whites after learning that their liberation
movement was not devoid of some degree of responsibility for the human
rights violations that were committed during apartheid.286
In his assessment of the work of the media, Gibson suggests that it was
precisely the simplicity with which they delivered the truth that came out of the
hearings of the Commission that engaged people in the process.

287

In contrast

to critics of the work of the media during the TRC, like Edward Bird, Zureida
Garda and Anthea Garman which are mentioned in Chapter 3, Gibson
considers that the way the media framed the stories of the TRC was successful,
because in lacking an ―explicit ideological veneer, […] they were palatable to
South Africans of many different ideological persuasions.‖ 288 The information,
which he qualifies as ―simple and subtle‖, attracted the attention of people to
the process because it was largely focused on the human side. The TRC,
through the media, put forward stories that had to do with ―bad guys hurting
good guys.‖289
However, one could argue that this framework was dangerously
simplistic because it dismissed the role of the racist foundation that sustained
the apartheid regime. Specifically, critics of the media and the TRC, as well as
this thesis, regard that both establishments failed to promote racial
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reconciliation because no effective discussion on racism took place during the
transitional justice process. The TRC‘s even-handedness that Gibson praises,
and the simplicity of the information that reached wider society which he
values, might just as well effectively disengaged the ‗beneficiaries‘ that
Mahmood Mamdani refers to from reflecting on their own roles during
apartheid. Similarly, the majority of Blacks who did not qualify as victims
under TRC terms, could have felt that the conflict‘s portrayal was unjustly
partial because it did not take into account their hardships. In fact, many did
feel so. Hence, to what extent do these views defy Gibson‘s interpretation of his
data? The South African Reconciliation Barometer poses an alternative reading
of the state of reconciliation in the country. Particularly, the Barometer‘s
analysis of race relations poses a direct challenge to Gibson‘s findings.
The State of Reconciliation: The South African Reconciliation Barometer
Since 2003, the SARB has treated race relations as an important indicator
when measuring the degree of reconciliation that the country has achieved.
Established by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the Barometer
measures the public‘s opinion on different issues, and the results are compiled
and published in a report.290 The complexity that is intrinsic to the concept of
reconciliation is acknowledged, but the IJR asserts that developing certain
quantifiable indicators that give a better picture of the degree of reconciliation is
plausible.291 The foundation of the SARB survey is modeled around the ―contact
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hypothesis‖ or inter-group contact theory, which suggests that higher levels of
interaction among people of different racial groups lead to a reduction in
prejudicist attitudes and conflict among these groups.292 Hence, echoing
Gibson‘s argument, the main hypothesis of SARB is that if ―…South Africans of
different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, reconciliation is
more likely to occur.‖293 The factors of identity, tolerance, and socialization
among different racial groups are considered.294 In the context of this thesis, the
relevance of this survey lies in its stated goal, which is to assess how people‘s
opinions may have an impact ―…on national unity and reconciliation in postapartheid South Africa.‖295 This language mirrors the objective of the
Parliamentary Act that established the TRC. As a result, the Barometer stands
not only as a tool that shows where South Africa is in terms of reconciliation.
Although it is not an explicit evaluation of the TRC, the Barometer could as well
be taken as a measure of the efficacy of the Commission in fostering
reconciliation in general.
The most relevant findings of the 2010 SARB are that while almost half of
the population perceives that race relations in South Africa have improved
since the end of apartheid, interracial interaction and socialization remain low.
The latter appears to have remained consistent over the years. 296 At a basic
level, most respondents said that they identify with people who primarily
speak their same language, followed by those who belong to their same ethnic
292
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group and race group. According to the report, this tendency has remained near
constant since 2007.297 At a general level, the report notes that ―...close to half of
all South Africans (47%) feel that there has been an improvement in race
relations in the country since 1994. A further 30% feel race relations have stayed
the same over this sixteen year period, and 21% that they have worsened.‖298
However, 42% of South Africans ―rarely‖ or ―never‖ speak to people of other
race groups, and a high 60% ―rarely‖ or ―never‖ socialize with people of other
race categories.299 Furthermore, 62% of South Africans found ―the customs and
ways of others difficult to understand…‖300, and 35% of people consider groups
from outside their race group to be untrustworthy.301 The latter findings are
relevant because the Barometer‘s hypothesis –if South Africans of different
races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, reconciliation is more
likely to occur- is somewhat disproved in light of the particularly high
percentage of people who find people from other races unreliable or their
customs rather odd.
When the analyses of James Gibson and the Reconciliation Barometer are
compared, the complexity of assessing race relations becomes clearer. These
studies are important because they show how certain research methods could
measure the impact of a truth-telling process on a specific aspect of society-in
this case, race relations.

They engage with the difficult task of providing

empirical evidence that help to draw connections with the TRC process,
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specifically James Gibson‘s work. At the same time, that these studies make
different assertions on the state of race relations deserves further discussion. For
this reason, more research work is needed in order to have more sources for
comparison and correlation. This thesis grapples with this need and attempts to
add another possible way of understanding race relations in South Africa today
as related to the transitional justice process.
This thesis will make use of inductive analysis in order to establish the
ways in which TRC‘s work and race relations in the present may be connected.
In parallel, content analysis will reveal how the media frames racial issues
today and the reasons for choosing such frameworks. Two particular events
will be explored: the Reitz Four case and the murder of Eugene Terre‘Blanche.
These are good cases in line with the purpose of this thesis for following main
reasons: a strong presence of the component of race; clear links to the history of
apartheid and its legacy; the nature of the debates that ensued; and their
extensive coverage in the media. Other cases could have been integrated in this
discussion as well. Nevertheless, the Reitz Four incident and the murder of
Terre‘Blanche have happened at a recent time period that enables the necessary
perspective for retrospective analysis. These cases bring to the fore how race is
still a highly complex issue in South Africa which deserves further analysis.
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Reitz Four: A University and Race
“When the focus of analysis shifts from that of individual pathology to one of institutional
culture, then it becomes clear that the problem of Reitz is not simply a problem of four racially
troubled students. It is, without a question, a problem of institutional complicity.” 302

Only a few events truly capture people‘s attention and stir the kind of
debate that brings to light how race continues to be relevant in South Africa.
The ‗Reitz Four‘ saga, as it came to be known in the media, was one of those
cases.

It involved a video which showed five Black cleaners of a men‘s

residence at the University of the Free State (UFS) being humiliated by four
white Afrikaner students in what appeared to be an ‗initiation ritual‘.303 The
video, recorded in September 2007 by the same students who administered the
initiation ritual, and leaked in February 2008, caused a wave of outrage and
condemnations from all levels of society. In the same manner, the decision of a
new UFS Vice-chancellor to pardon the students for their actions was highly
unwelcomed, initiating a new round of national debate regarding proper
measures of justice to cases in which racism is a key issue. In July 2010, two
years after the video became public, the Bloemfontein Magistrate‘s Court found
the four students guilty of crimen injuria, which under South African law, is
any act that intentionally and seriously impairs the dignity of others.304
The case became especially notorious as it spurred nationwide debate.
The Reitz Four incident was as much about the five Black workers and the four
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white students in the video as it was about the environment of UFS as an
academic institution. This event brought to light a number of troubling aspects
that questioned the extent to which features of apartheid were truly in the past
for this university. For instance, other issues of racism at UFS came to light,
such as the continuing role of a political party in exacerbating those issues and
memories of the position of the university during apartheid, as well as the
legacy of that position. At the same time, the decision of the university‘s new
vice-Chancellor to withdraw charges against the students was remarkable as it
was done in the same spirit of reconciliation that the TRC aimed to embrace,
and in spite the immediate reaction of most newspapers to this decision which
was overwhelmingly critical.
All these elements reveal a number of important dimensions for the
analysis of race relations in South Africa today. The first dimension relates to
the persistence of a racist legacy that has yet to be effectively uprooted. Another
dimension relates to the way most people reacted and condemned the acts of
the students, suggesting that racist acts are deeply rejected. At the same time, a
larger debate about the state of race relations in the country curiously did not
ensue. At best, the Reitz Four debate triggered a discussion and a revision of
racial problems on university campuses. In this context, newspapers focused
overwhelmingly on the individuals involved in the video, and they did so from
a condemnatory angle. However, the conciliatory approach of the Vicechancellor is particularly important in this analysis because it suggests the
possibility that the TRC set a strong precedent. Related to this is the reaction of
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the newspapers to the Vice-chancellor‘s decision, which seems to have revived
the same debate about justice that accompanied the creation of the TRC. On one
level, the generally negative response of a number of newspapers mirrors
sentiments of unfulfilled injustice among Blacks, similar to the way that the
TRC process and the foregoing of prosecutions dissatisfied some victims in the
past. On another level, the supportive tone of newspapers such as the
Mail&Guardian and Business Day reflects the type of attitude that individuals
like Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela and others stood for at the demise of
apartheid.
Reitz Four: Overview of the Case
In a timeframe of ten minutes, four white young men appear on a video
subjecting five Black workers to what appear to be initiation rituals, which
range from a running competition, to emptying beer bottles, to ultimately
bending on the floor to eat what looks like food in which one of the students
had urinated. The video, which was filmed in September 2007, became a
scandal at a national level when the Afrikaner newspaper Beeld published it in
February 2008.305 The white men in the video -Danie Grobler, Johnny Roberts,
Roelf Malherde and Schalk van der Merwe – were Afrikaner students of the
University of the Free State (UFS), which is located in Bloemfontein (capital of
the Free State province of South Africa‘s central region). The scene took place in
the residence halls of the all male‘s student hostel ―President Reitz‖ - hence the
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name that the case earned in the media.306 Mothibedi Molete, Mankoe Phororo,
Emmah Koko, Nkgapeng Adams and Sebuasengwe Ntlatseng, all janitors of the
hostel, were the targets of the ―initiation rituals‖ that the students
administered.307 Soon after the video‘s release, the South African Human Rights
Commission initiated an investigation into allegations that the university had
condoned human rights violations.308 Parallel to this, university officials stated
that its legal-department would seek to file criminal charges against the
students. Ultimately, it was decided that the criminal charges would be left in
the hands of the South African authorities while the university would appoint a
disciplinary committee to deal with the case.309 Four months after the scandal,
the university‘s rector Teuns Verschoor announced to the council of the
university his decision to close down the Reitz residence.310 Eventually, Roelf
Malherde and Schalk van der Merwe were dismissed from the university and
banned from campus, while Danie Grobler and Johnny Roberts had already
finished their studies. 311 The students claimed to the court that the workers had
freely participated in the video, but still admitted their guilt and asked for
forgiveness. In the end, the Bloemfontein Magistrate‘s Court found the four
students guilty of crimen injuria in July 2010.312 An aspect that quickly became
prominent in the discussion surrounding this case was the position of the
university during apartheid, and how that might help explain the ongoing
306
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issues of racism that were brought to the spotlight. The wrongdoing of four
individuals served to reveal the institutional dimension of racism, thereby
suggesting a failure to fully remove some remnants of the racist past.
UFS and the Burden of History
Pressing issues of racism at UFS, often regarded as a ‗bastion for
Afrikaners‘, came under the national spotlight with the Reitz Four case. Former
vice-rector of the university Teuns Verschoor admitted that an uncritical
approach to politics had characterized UFS throughout history. When the
British were in power in the early years of the 20th century, he said, ―the
university operated in English only and excluded many people on the basis of
their race as well as their language.― Once Afrikaans became the official
language in the late 1940‘s, ―[the university] not only followed but actively
promoted the apartheid policy.‖313 For this reason, university authorities have
been trying to dismantle the legacy of the apartheid past by diversifying the
student body, which today is made up of 58% African, 35% white, 5% coloured,
and 2% Indian.314 Yet, according to Black students who were interviewed by a
white press reporter on the university campus, the percentages do not reflect
how race still determines social interactions. ―Just look around‖, said one of the
interviewees when referring to different groups of students, ―They are all
racially separate groups. They think we‘re funny to be speaking to you.‖315
Other Black students noted the high levels of exclusion in the residences, which
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some even feared passing by due to the possibility of being verbally or
physically abused.316 Efforts to change this situation have not been met without
obstacles either.
Throughout most of the 1990s, integration policies caused much conflict
at UFS. For instance, in 1992, a policy was put in place to de-segregate
residences. Nevertheless, violent protests led to their ‗re-segregation‘.

317

The

Reitz student residence was closed after some students released teargas in a
university hall. Some years later, however, it reopened due to reported ‗whiteflight‘ from other university dorms because more Black students were moving
in. Thereafter, the Reitz residence gained the negative reputation of being
‗rowdy‘ and, as one student called it, ―a home for disgruntled right-wing
students during the mid-Nineties.‖318 In 2007, the university tried to implement
a policy that would re-integrate the residences, mandating that they each had to
include at least 30% Black students. The attempt was unpopular in sections of
the Afrikaner community of the university, with protests and demonstrations
on campus following the implementation of the policy.319 In the aftermath of
the Reitz Four incident, these racial issues were brought up by the media.
Interestingly, a link was established between the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and
its role in exacerbating Afrikaner students‘ defiance of university efforts to
bridge racial divides.
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The FF+ is a small political party in South Africa that explicitly aims to
safeguard the interests of Afrikaners. Founded in 1994 by the right-wing leader
Constant Viljoen, the party has stood on a platform that is largely defined by an
ethnic/racial component and secessionist ambitions. The party‘s ideology,
which is modeled on the concept of minority rights, puts forward the argument
that in a heterogeneous society such as South Africa, a ―one man, one vote‖
system leaves the Afrikaner minority at an unfairly disadvantaged position.320
Under the leadership of Pieter Mulder, who is now Deputy Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the party has continuously pressed for a
legitimate Afrikaner dispensation and the provision of territorial autonomy (an
Afrikaner ‗volkstat‘ or homeland) in the region of the North Western Cape, in
an area between the Orange River and the West Coast.321 Although the party
retains four seats in the National Assembly as of now, its political influence is
low. Nevertheless, in provinces like the Free State where Afrikaners make up a
significant portion of the white population, the FF+ can still rally enthusiastic
supporters who feel threatened with official efforts at empowering the
previously disenfranchised Black majority. Places like UFS, where racial
tensions have run high for most of its history, are breeding grounds of potential
followers for FF+, despite the fact that when compared with the large reach of
major parties, the party mobilizes only a small number of people nationally.
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Although there was no specific connection between the FF+ and the
Reitz Four incident, the party had a role in upsetting strategies towards racial
integration at UFS which may have contributed to the types of attitudes that
were present in the Reitz Four video. According to one press story, the political
party and its youth wing, which stand on a platform of protection and
representation of Afrikaner interests, have long been instrumental in
historically-white academic institutions for promoting campaigns against racial
integration.322 During the 1990s, the party was involved at UFS through a
cultural organization that promoted Afrikaner values. For instance, at the time
when the Reitz Four case became a national controversy, the Student
Representative Council (SRC) of UFS consisted of 16 members, of which 13
were members of the FF+. The role of the party became particularly relevant at
the outset of the university‘s official efforts towards integration. In July 2007,
the time when the university council approved the residence integration policy,
the FF+ national leader Pieter Mulder, as well as other members of the party,
was present at one of the biggest marches on campus organized by the party
against the new policy.323 According to Sandra Botha, the then parliamentary
leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) party, racist songs such as Bobbejaan klim
die Berg, (―baboon climbs the mountain‖) were allegedly sung by FF+
supporters at the march.324 Furthermore, in November of the same year, the
party challenged the university‘s integration policy in court but withdrew the
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case.

325

However, the persistent demand of the party for racial separation did

not dwindle even at the height of the controversy that the video sparked.
Although the FF+ denied any connection to the UFS student body and
rejected accusations of responsibility for the Reitz Four scandal, in arguing for
racial separation, party members were tacitly condoning the behavior of
students. In one instance, the FF+ youth congress in the Northern Cape
Province resolved that government-imposed quotas on student organizations,
courses and residences would be countered by promoting a ‗culture of freedom
of association‘. At the time, the national youth leader Cornelius Jansen van
Rensburg expressed: ―How free am I if government policy determines whom I
should share a room with?‖326 In trying to justify the racist sentiments that
materialized at UFS, Pieter Mulder- the FF+ national leader- pointed at the
famous ―Two Nation‖ speech of former President Thabo Mbeki.327 He
suggested that by alluding to the existence of two distinct racial groups (these
groups being Blacks and whites), the former president had set a tone that
would inevitably exacerbate racial tensions. In addition, he mentioned the
unintended consequences of the policy of black economic empowerment and
how it could feed into Afrikaner students‘ frustrations:
―Everyone has respect for [Nelson] Mandela and his rainbow nation, but
it was exactly 10 years ago that [Thabo] Mbeki made his two-nation
speech. He scratched out the rainbow nation with that speech by
continuously speaking about two races… [ ]
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Perhaps we are reaping the fruits of this. Students know that racism is
unacceptable, but in the back of their heads they know once they leave
university they will face affirmative action. They know they will be
discriminated against and we don‘t know what role this is playing in the
aggressive behavior we are now seeing.‖328
Certainly, Mulder‘s comments reflected the types of ideas and perceptions that
continue to justify racism, particularly at academic institutions that carry the
burden of apartheid‘s history like UFS and University of Pretoria. Although
UFS authorities made gestures to change aspects of the university that were a
legacy of apartheid‘s racism, a portion of the Afrikaner student body,
sponsored by some political actors with a particular agenda, have actively
pursued ways to undermine any meaningful change.
Thanks to the Reitz Four incident, issues of racism at the institutional
level were revealed and a debate on the state of higher education ensued. The
enduring racial segregation in the dorms, the strained relations among students
of different racial groups, the dissatisfaction of members of the Afrikaner
student body towards integration efforts, and the effect of political ideology in
fostering racism at UFS were some of the problems that surfaced with this
incident. These issues were unsettling because they made it seem as if nothing
had truly changed at UFS. If anything, the departure from the past had only
been superficial, while at a deeper level, the racist culture that characterized the
institution during apartheid was still deeply rooted in its essence. At a broader
level, while the incident sparked a debate on the status of higher education, it
did not go beyond this realm of discussion. For instance, the Education Minister
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set up investigative committees to look into any irregularities on campuses that
could dampen integration efforts. Furthermore, the vice-chancellor of the
University of Limpopo, Mahlo Mokgalong, urged his colleagues to be frank and
face the fact that there was a problem in the higher education system. He and
all of the country‘s public university vice-chancellors convened to discuss
strategies to combat racism at a meeting in March of 2008. Apart from these
gestures, a general consensus seems to exist about the wrongness of the acts
committed in the video.
The press covered the Reitz Four incident from a condemnatory angle,
fair evidence that racist acts are not tolerated and earn the condemnation of the
majority of the population. The fact that Beeld, the same Afrikaner newspaper
that had declined to appear before the TRC, brought attention to the video is
remarkable. In fact, that it was the same newspaper that supported apartheid
for a long time that put the spotlight on the Reitz Four case could represent a
step away from the past. Other major newspapers like The Star, Sowetan, and
Mail&Guardian emphasized the outrage of the general public over the incident.
These positions show proof that acts of racism could be the object of much
criticism. The greatest limitation to this argument is the fact that most press
stories focused on the case from a largely individualistic point of view. For
instance, journalists gave much attention to the students who perpetrated the
acts and the judiciary process they were involved in subsequently. In contrast,
the victims of the video remained in the background of the stories. Their
perspectives or opinions about what they went through almost never made the
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headlines. This framework could have taken away the spotlight from the issues
of institutionalized racism that later on, the new Vice-chancellor attempted to
address.
A deeper reflection on the state of race relations in the country as whole
seemed to have failed to materialize, if the newspapers‘ approach to the story is
a legitimate representation of the main perspectives and interests of society.
Largely, the debate swirled around the perpetrators of the video, some
reference to the institutional environment at UFS, and at best, issues of racism
in higher education. Neither was a connection to the TRC made at this point. At
least in newspapers, a concrete discussion on how the transitional justice
process might have accounted for the unchallenged features of apartheid did
not emerge. References to an ongoing problem of a racist mentality among
certain groups, particularly political parties like the FF+ that still advocate for
racial segregation and a lack of oversight at academic institutions were made.
Where a discussion on the morality and appropriateness of approaches to
justice and redress did figure was a year after this incident took place. The
decision of a new Vice-chancellor, unexpected and controversial, provoked yet
another round of national debate that this time did resemble the discussions
around the TRC.
A Bid for Reconciliation and its Repercussions
Professor Jonathan Jansen, the newly appointed 2009 vice-chancellor of
UFS (the equivalent of the President of a university in the US), framed his
decision to withdraw charges against the Reitz Four students, along with
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compensating the victims, as a gesture of acknowledgment of the institution‘s
responsibility in the matter and a step towards reconciliation and
transformation. As the first Black vice-chancellor at UFS, Jansen was a highlyregarded professor who held various academic degrees, including a PhD in
Education from Stanford University as a Fulbright scholar.329 In October 2009,
his decision was a focal point of his inauguration speech:
―In a gesture of racial reconciliation, and the need for healing, the
University of the Free State will withdraw its own charges against the
four students. The University will therefore not pursue any further
action against the four young men implicated in the Reitz incident. In
this spirit of toenadering (raprochement), the University will go further,
and invite those four students to continue their studies here.
In recognition of our institutional complicity in the Reitz saga, and the
need for social justice, the University of the Free State will not only
pursue forgiveness but will also pay reparations to the workers
concerned for damages to their dignity and their self-esteem.‖330
This redefined position on the case was a part of Jansen‘s larger agenda of
radically transforming the university.
The Vice-chancellor believed that the university had to accept its own
responsibility in the matter. Clearly, structural conditions at the institutional
level contributed to the kind of environment conducive to instances like the
Reitz Four. He thought it wrong to understand the Reitz Four solely in
individual terms and reminded the audience that racial tensions had been
building up before the video scandal, showing evidence of a much deeper
problem that could not be solved by punishing a few:
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―You see, the biggest mistake made in the analysis of Reitz is to explain
the incident in terms of individual pathology. Yet to dismiss the video as
a product of four bad apples is too easy an explanation. This video
recording was preceded by a long series of racial incidents protesting
racial integration especially in the residences of the university. Not all of
these racially charged incidents made the press; in fact, had it not been
for the public release of the video recording, no-one outside the
university would have known about it.‖331
For this reason, he believed that a legal approach, with its court setting, would
not solve the ―deeper issues of racism and bigotry that conflict [the] university‖,
and added that unless something different was done, the university will
continue dealing in the future with the ―…same social, cultural and ideological
complexities that stand in the way of transformation.‖332 Moreover, the vicechancellor called for the re-opening of the Reitz residence in the hope that it
would become a model for racial reconciliation and social justice. In addition,
he expressed his intention of establishing The Reitz Institute for Studies in Race,
Reconciliation and Social Justice,333 which in fact was inaugurated in January 2011
as the International Institute for the Studies of Race, Reconciliation and Social
Justice.334 Jansen‘s speech, in particular the withdrawal of charges, was met with
immediate and overwhelming criticism from the population and most
newspapers.
Even though the criminal charges against the students remained in
Bloemfontein‘s regional court, the decision of the vice-chancellor was the object
of much disapproval. Soon after the decision hit the headlines, Jansen issued a
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media statement in which he reiterated the following: ―The criminal charges
against the students were laid by the Directorate of Special Prosecutions in the
province, and the university has no say over those processes in criminal courts.
That process remains in place.‖ He added that ―the university simply withdrew
its own complaint against the students…and on that basis decided to invite the
students back to continue their studies.‖335 Nevertheless, a number of
newspapers echoed the resentment of large parts of the population. The Sunday
Times, South Africa‘s largest newspaper, sold the story under the headline of
―Jansen ‗racists‘ pardon slated: Vice-chancellor ‗should have punished‘ the
Reitz Four.‖336 ―UFS racists free‖ read the cover-page of the Saturday Star, the
weekend edition of The Star, a daily newspaper which has 50% Black
readership.337 The story stressed the ―outrage‖ that followed the dropping of
charges against the students.338
For the most part, the ANC -the official party in government- declared
that the vice-chancellor‘s decision was wrong for two reasons. First, the charges
were withdrawn without admission of guilt and a formal apology from the
perpetrators to the victims. Themba Maseko, the government spokesman, said:
―The process that led to the dropping of the charges was flawed in that it did
not follow the established norm of getting the perpetrators to admit guilt, to
apologize to the victims before any charges could be dropped and to initiate a
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reconciliation process.‖339Also, the victims were not consulted as to whether
they would feel comfortable with pardoning the students without proper
redress for the damage that was done to them. The ANC Youth League
spokesman, Floyd Shivambu, noted that people were still unaware if the
perpetrators felt any remorse for their acts and if the victims would find peace
without a proper judicial process.340 For these reasons, the Minister of Higher
Education, Blade Nzimande, argued that the decision of Professor Jansen
amounted to a superficial trade-off: ―[He] has taken it upon himself to absolve
the perpetrators on behalf of the victims and compensate the victims on behalf
of the perpetrators.‖341 In the view of the Minister, this trade-off sadly meant
more damage to the dignity of the victims. In taking a different approach to the
case, the vice-chancellor appeared to have further divided society on how to
deal with racism.342
These positions were strikingly similar to a number of perspectives
towards amnesty for the perpetrators during apartheid and the TRC process in
general. The newspapers primarily reflected a sense of justice unfulfilled with
the decision of the vice-chancellor, similar to the sentiments that many victims
expressed towards the provision of amnesty and the TRC process in general.
The idea that drove people‘s reactions in both instances (the TRC period and
the reconciliation effort of the vice-chancellor) was that justice, understood
solely in the form of judicial trials and punishment, cannot be replaced with any
339
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alternative mechanism. In the Reitz Four case people were demanding that the
students be sanctioned properly by a court for their actions, in the same way
that victims of apartheid claimed that the torture and the killings of apartheid
could not under any circumstance be pardoned. At the core of the students‘
behavior as well as in many of the acts of apartheid supporters was a racist
mindset that needed to be castigated with a due judicial process. The desire to
punish incidents motivated by racism surfaced with the Reitz Four like it did
during the TRC process. People‘s negative reactions to the decision of the Vicechancellor also have hinted at an ambition to not grant the kind of impunity
that people in the past, or specifically Mamdani‘s ‗beneficiaries‘, perhaps
enjoyed with the lack of punishment of racism. Hence, many could have
perceived Jansen‘s redefined approach to the case as an inadmissible violation
of due justice.
The ANC, albeit highly critical of the withdrawal of charges, seemed to
be rather more preoccupied about the manner in which the vice-chancellor
proceeded. The reaction of some party and government members seemed to be
informed with the same principle that established conditionality to the
provision of amnesty during the TRC. As noted in Chapter 3, the Commission
operated under the condition of full disclosure of the truth and public
recognition of wrongdoing before the granting of amnesty. This condition was a
breakthrough, because had the Post-amble of the Constitution, which
guaranteed the provision of amnesty, been followed without objection,
perpetrators of apartheid might have only needed to request amnesty to receive
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it. In this sense, the TRC set a remarkable precedent because it ensured some
degree of accountability from them. To an extent, the words of the government
spokesman Themba Maseko were a request for the same type of accountability
that the mandate of the TRC put in place, because while he did not condemn
the vice-chancellor‘s attempt, he challenged the initiation of a ‗process of
reconciliation‘ without firstly providing the guarantee that the perpetrators
recognized and assumed their guilt. Although the ANC Youth League
spokesman did call for a fair judicial process for the students, he also
mentioned the discomfort with the fact that the perpetrators had not expressed
remorse clearly. Given that the students had not asked for forgiveness and since
a proper measure of redress for the victims‘ had not been discussed, a judicial
mechanism would be better suited for the case. The Higher Education Minister
dismissed the vice-chancellor‘s decision on similar grounds, but was much
more skeptical of the very attempt at reconciliation. The claim that the vicechancellor had in fact further eroded any sense of national unity with such an
approach could be understood as saying that most South Africans agreed that
racism needed to be punished judicially, and that he was going against the will
of many individuals.
Views supporting the Vice-chancellor were minimal. Nevertheless, some
newspapers and particular individuals did take a more overarching approach
to the case. For instance, the Canvas Life section of the Saturday Star newspaper
presented a broader analysis, spelling out the reasons why the Vice-chancellor‘s
decision was highly contentious. The headline of an entire page read ―Vexed
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varsity‘s new broom‖, followed by the statement ―A brave new vice-chancellor
won‘t just mop up the mess from one ugly racial incident…‖ 343 Two problems
were identified. First, confusion about the different legal processes underway
appeared to fuel the sense of outrage of some people. Second, the fact that the
workers were not consulted before any decision the vice-chancellor reached his
decision deepened some people‘s sense of injustice.
A key aspect of the article was its reference to a lingering sentiment of
uneasiness among people because appropriate judiciary measures to punish
racism had not been established yet. The article stressed that the academic‘s
decision would be praised as an act of reconciliation ―in a country still troubled
by the pain of the past‖, but that he would be equally ―vilified for, at the very
least, not giving Adams, Koko, Phororo, Ntseng and Molete the opportunity to
be the catalysts of a formal court discussion about race that has been waiting for
years in the wings of our democracy.‖344 The last statement is particularly
important, because it alludes to a desire of having a discussion in South Africa
that would specifically tackle the problem of racism. Moreover, the framing of
the discussion as a ―formal court discussion‖ suggests the aspiration of
punishing racism through a court setting, and as far as the legal system would
allow.
A couple of newspapers concentrated on Jansen‘s argument of
institutional responsibility rather than on the fact that the students would be
pardoned with his decision. The Mail&Guardian, a weekly newspaper known
343
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for its in-depth coverage of political analysis, focused on the need to recognize
the larger issues of racism at UFS.345 Similarly, the Business Day, South Africa‘s
business daily newspaper, praised Jansen‘s announcement and called it a
―brave decision‖ in its editorial.346 Beeld and Die Burger, both Afrikaan-speaking
newspapers, reflected the controversy that the decision had caused, but
refrained from framing the issue in a condemnatory way. The headline of Beeld
read ―Reitz: Offenders are welcome again, says Prof. Jansen‖ 347, and Die
Burger’s remarked: ―Jansen invited Reitz 4 back ‗as gesture of reconciliation and
healing.‘348
Among the few people who came forward to support the vicechancellor, were Desmond Tutu and the deputy chief executive of the South
African Institute of Race Relations, Frans Conje. Tutu publicly supported
Jansen‘s gesture, expressing that the new rector had made South Africans
proud and reminding everyone of what could have happened had the country
chosen revenge rather than the process of the TRC.349 Frans Conje called critics
to reconsider their positions and praise Jansen‘s decision for what it was,
courageous and exemplary. He reminded people that in the 1990s, many
supporters of apartheid offered apologies to the point of insincerity. Contrary to
the view of the Minister of Higher Education, Conje believed that Jansen was
345
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setting an extraordinary precedent, because, as a Black man, it could only be
remarkable that he would be calling for reconciliation. He said: ―Here was a
black man assuming the responsibility for what the white guard had done
before him, and apologizing to the country for that.‖350 Such support for
Jansen‘s position was in line with the views of people who stressed the need to
reconcile and to focus on restoration after apartheid, rather than to choose
revenge and retribution. The newspapers that focused on the institutional
issues of UFS put forward arguments that resembled the support for a truthtelling mechanism over prosecutions. Their emphasis was on the idea that
punishment of a few individuals would not fix the much deeper structural
problems of racism.
Reflecting on Conje‘s comments, it could be said that Jansen followed the
steps of Nelson Mandela or Desmond Tutu. Jansen, as the first Black man to
become vice-chancellor of a historically white-Afrikaner university, emulated
Tutu and the former president, himself the first democratically elected Black
president of South Africa, by requesting a departure from the past via the path
of reconciliation and not vengeance. For the symbolism, Jansen‘s gesture was
comparable to the time when Mandela attended a rugby match of the world
cup competition - rugby being a traditionally Afrikaner sport - wearing the
jersey of the team. His reasoning was in tune with scholars who supported the
TRC and considered that mechanisms of justice other than trials might do more
for the advancement and the entrenchment of a culture respectful of human
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rights. In addition, Jansen‘s decision was accompanied by a commitment for
institutional transformation, such as making classes of African-speaking
languages like isiZulu and isiXhosa compulsory for Afrikaner students, while
Afrikaans would be mandatory for Blacks.351 Also, the inauguration of the
International Institute for the Studies of Race, Reconciliation and Social Justice in
January 2011 shows evidence of the continuing efforts to move away from the
legacy of apartheid and the racist elements that led to the Reitz Four incident.
Yet, a year before this event took place, in April 2010, the murder of Eugene
Terre‘Blanche took place, shaking the conscience of South Africans and again
earning the attention of the international media.
Eugene Terre’Blanche: A Man and his Race
Just as the Reitz Four saga became a nationwide topic for debate, the
murder of the Afrikaner leader Eugene Terre‘Blanche in 2010 motivated
another discussion that brought to the forefront the issue of racism from a
different angle. In contrast to the Reitz Four case, the notoriety of
Terre‘blanche‘s murder was as much as result of his historical position, coupled
with the fact that two of his African workers murdered him on his own farm.
The killing unleashed a debate with a number of important layers. As a founder
of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or most commonly known as AWB
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement in English)352 and as the leader of the hardline resistance against the impending demise of apartheid, the murder of
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Eugene Terre‘Blanche highlighted the interplay of politics and race in South
Africa. On one hand, it put the spotlight on the political role of Eugene
Terre‘Blanche in the past and sparked a debate about his influence in the
present. On the other hand, the issue became all the more controversial because
it happened only a few months after Julius Malema, leader of the African
National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), was accused of inciting racial
violence for singing a song from apartheid‘s resistance years with the lyrics
―shoot the boer‖ in it (boer is the Afrikaans word for farmers, especially
Afrikaner farmers). For this reason, newspaper headlines reflected the
speculations of growing racial divisions in the country and the potential for
violent racial conflict. In fact, the AWB used the instance as an opportunity to
show evidence of the alleged dangers that the Afrikaner community faces in the
new South Africa, particularly the violent attacks against white farmers.
However, some commentators disagreed that the murder was a by-product of
racial tensions and argued that class status was a better determinant of this
incident.
The Terre‘Blanche case provides important insights for the analysis of
contemporary race relations in South Africa as a potential function of the TRC
process and the media. On one level, the murder exposed how political actors
and specific ideologies continue to exacerbate racial tensions, thereby
challenging the idea that a full departure from attitudes of the past has been
achieved. For instance, both Terre‘Blanche and Malema had been responsible
for using language that could incite racial division and racial violence. Also, the
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AWB‘s relentless demand for racial segregation, similar to the ideology of the
FF+, shows that remnants of the divisive racist ideology which kept apartheid
in place still remain. On another level, the Terre‘Blanche murder initiated a
debate about the nature of violence in South Africa and its connection to race.
An aspect of the discussion focused on ‗farm attacks‘, an issue that affects the
Afrikaner community most prominently. The fact that many Afrikaners believe
that these are attacks fueled by racism, disregarding the fact that crime is
widespread and that, in fact, Blacks are more likely to be assaulted by other
Blacks, shows proof of an ongoing distrust towards members of other races.
Also, the heightened fears of a potential breakout of racial violence that loomed
in the aftermath of the murder point to persistent racial tensions in the country.
At the same time, the fact that no major event of racial violence materialized
after the murder –despite its anticipation by the international media in contrast
to the less sensationalist tone of local newspapers- could underpin the
argument that factors other than race play a more relevant role in incidents of
violence.
Terre’Blanche’s Murder: the Case
On April 3, 2010, news that Eugene Terre‘Blanche, the leader of the
AWB, had been found murdered on his farm spread quickly around the
country. Two African male workers on Terre‘Blanche‘s farm located, on the
outskirts of the town of Ventersdorp in the North West province of the country,
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were charged with the murder.353 On April 6, the suspects Chris Mahlangu (27)
and a 15-year-old minor appeared at the Ventersdorp Magistrate‘s Court amid
tight police security due to fears of violent encounters between supporters of
Terre‘Blanche and black residents who were present.354 The accused faced
charges of ―murder, housebreaking with intent to rob, robbery with
aggravating

circumstances,

crimen

injuria

and

attempted

robbery.‖355

According to the police, the mutilated body of Terre‘Blanche was found on his
bed with his pants pulled down, and a panga (machete) and a knobkerrie (cane)
were lying around him, signs of the violent nature of murder.356
Terre’Blanche in Politics
Eugene

Terre‘Blanche

embodied

the

racism

and

violence

that

characterized apartheid South Africa. In the 1970‘s, he founded the Afrikaner
Weerstandsbeweging movement (AWB) to push a white supremacist agenda.357
Flags with swastika-like symbols and neo-Nazi anthems were common features
at gatherings of the movement‘s adherents.358 He is remembered as a ―powerful
Afrikaans orator‖ who would appear at rallies riding a horse.359 He became
particularly notable during the transitional period to democracy because he
sought to destabilize the political negotiations through violent attacks and
threats of civil war.360 In fact, a hundred people were injured and 21 people
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died in one of his most brutal attacks.361 Nevertheless, his campaign failed to
stop the eventual demise of the racist regime, and in 1998, he recognized his
political and moral responsibility at a TRC hearing for some of the deadly
violence that threatened to destabilize the 1994 elections.362 Terre‘Blanche‘s
prominence during apartheid and his ideals would play a negligible role in
post-apartheid South Africa.
Although Terre‘Blanche‘s rhetoric was largely discredited in the new
democratic order, he continued to advocate for a racially segregated South
Africa. His insistence that a multiracial democracy would fail, coupled with a
shameful three-year term in jail for assaulting a Black gas station attendant and
attempting to kill a Black security guard made him earn even the contempt of
some Afrikaners.363 For these reasons, for the most part he kept a low-profile
after his jail release in 2004. Speaking about Terre‘Blanche‘s influence, Allister
Sparks expressed: ―He was a has-been personality…his influence is absolutely
minimal. I regarded him as one of the most remarkably powerful orators I‘ve
ever heard. He spoke with great passion and could really move people, but that
was before 1994 when he was trying to mount his rather crazy resistance
campaign.‖364 Yet, Terre‘Blanche‘s desire to keep the races apart never wained.
One year before his death, he attempted to make a comeback in politics by
declaring his intentions of rallying Afrikaner far-right groups behind the
361
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secessionist goal of establishing an Afrikaner republic. This republic would
stand in Northern Natal and the Eastern Transvaal, today the provinces of
Kwa-Zulu Natal and Mpumalanga respectively, which, according to him, were
territories that belong to the boerevolk (Dutch settlers‘ land) by divine right. 365
He also justified his claims by pointing at the dangers that Afrikaners faced in a
racially-integrated country. Terre‘Blanche argued that the unity of the new
South Africa was the cause of all the contemporary maladies that pervaded
society. ―It‘s about the right of a nation that wants to separate itself from a unity
state filled with crime, death, murder, rape, lies and fraud‖ he once said.366
Although his ideas never materialized, they became significant in the
discussion that took place after his murder. In the same way, the inflammatory
rhetoric of ANC leader Julius Malema gained importance as some
commentators blamed him for heating up the political atmosphere which could
trigger racial violence.
Who is Julius Malema?
Immediately after the death of Terre‘Blanche, a wave of accusations was
directed at the ANC Youth League main leader Julius Malema for what some
commentators considered to be his role in inciting racial violence against white
farmers. In order to understand the reason why Malema‘s comments have
earned the attention of the public and have become the object of much debate
until today, his influence of in South African politics has to be examined first.
Born in Polokwane, the capital of Limpopo- in northern region of the country365
366
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and coming from a poor rural background, Malema rose to forefront of the
political arena in the ANC through its Youth League, which is, according to
Mail&Guardian political reporter Mandy Roussow, ―a powerful lobby group
that prides itself in selecting the future ANC president.‖367 Malema has claimed
that he was recruited into the party at the age of nine, and that by the age of
thirteen he was given a handgun to attend the funeral of anti-apartheid Chris
Hani in Johannesburg.368 He ascended the ranks of the party structure
surrounded by well-known ANC leaders such as the late Peter Mokaba, 369 who
once himself was an ANC Youth League leader and a popular militant of the
resistance against apartheid, known for shout the slogan ―Kill the farmer, kill
the boer‖ at rallies in the 1980s and 1990s.370 In fact, when Malema was
indirectly associated with the murder of Terre‘Blanche, an AWB leader
compared him to Mokaba.
By April 2008, Malema took on the presidency of the Youth League.371
―Being Youth League president,‖ Roussow explains, ―made Malema a force to
be reckoned with in the South African political scene, a position which he used
to his full advantage.‖372 The fact that he was elected president by the youth of a
key establishment of the ANC is telling of the influence that Malema wields,
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even though he is also disliked by many people in society.373 Malema draws his
power from his own character- a powerful mixture of demagoguery and
bluntness that makes him earn both respect and fear among those who
surround him: ―Although Malema holds no official government position and is
only an ad hoc member of the ANC‘s powerful national working committee
(NWC), he knows that when he talks, everyone—inside and outside the ANC—
listens.‖374 His remarks and the issues in which he has been involved
continuously have been the subject of newspaper headlines. At the same time,
issues that he has brought up have been received with skepticism and
sometimes condemnation within his own party.375
Of the issues that have raised Malema‘s profile, his support for a
nationalization plan that could mirror the problematic experience of
neighboring Zimbabwe, particularly with land reform, has been the object of
concern and speculation inside and outside the ANC. While the Terre‘Blanche
murder was making the headlines, Malema publicly praised President Robert
Mugabe‘s economic policies at a rally in a township of Harare, the capital of
Zimbabwe. He expressed his approval of the contested land reform record of
the country, which at some point has been based on drastic and even violent
measures of seizures of white-owned land. He proclaimed that he would bring
that strategy to South Africa, and justified the confiscation of property on the
grounds of race: ―In South Africa we are just starting. Here in Zimbabwe you
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are already very far. The land question has been addressed. We are very happy
that today you can account for more than 300,000 new farmers against the 4000
who used to dominate agriculture. We hear you are now going going straight to
the mines. That‘s what we are going to be doing in South Africa.‖376 In specific
reference to white-ownership of mines in South Africa, he added, ―We want the
mines. They have been exploiting our minerals for a long time. Now it‘s our
turn to also enjoy from these minerals. They are so bright, they are colorful, we
refer to them as white people. Maybe their color came as a result of exploiting
our minerals.‖377
These comments were all the more significant because not only was
Malema‘s behavior being the target of widespread criticism, but he was also
contravening Zuma‘s political agenda. For instance, while Malema was siding
himself with the ZANU-PF (Mugabe‘s political party) and its tactics, President
Jacob Zuma was engaged in negotiations to settle a deal between President
Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai.378 In spite of several attempts
to minimize the implications of his nationalization proposal by saying that no
Zimbabwean style ‗land-grabs‘ would happen in South Africa, his demeaning
comments about president Jacob Zuma, coupled with an incident in which he
verbally confronted and insulted a BBC journalist at a news conference,
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motivated the ANC to undertake a disciplinary process for Malema.379 His final
sentence included taking anger management classes and making a public
apology for his careless references about the president.380 In fact, he was put
down by Zuma for wanting to make nationalization an ANC policy at an ANC
conference in Durban in September 2010.381 Malema, however, did not become
associated to the murder of the AWB leader simply because of his personality.
A particular event that took place a month before the murder of Terre‘Blanche
ignited a row of discussion on the implications of using of anti-apartheid
struggle songs and symbols in the post-apartheid period.
What is in a Song and a Farm
On March 10, 2010, Malema led a student protest at the University of
Johannesburg in the Gauteng province in which he made derogatory comments
about opposition leaders like Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and
Patricia de Lille of the Independent Democrats (ID).382 Yet, the focus of outrage
was a song from the anti-apartheid period which contained the lyrics ―shoot the
boer‖ (kill the farmer) in it.383 Condemnation by members of parties like the
Freedom Front and the Afrikanerbond organization followed immediately, and
an order was issued by the North Gauteng High Court which prohibited
Malema from singing the song again.384 Yet, with the murder of the AWB
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leader, some people argued that at some level, Malema was largely to blame. In
this context also, the general state of insecurity that white farmers have suffered
since the end of apartheid was highlighted, although the connection between
the post-apartheid state and these attacks has been hard to prove.385
Analyses of the possible motivations of farm attacks discredit racism as a
explanatory variable. Farm attacks have been defined as a particularly violent
phenomenon that originated in the 1990s, whereby a large number of white
farmers were the targets of attacks, some of them characterized by their extreme
brutality.386 These attacks built the misleading perception among members of
the Afrikaner community that the state wanted to drive them out of their land,
even though a commission of inquiry in 2001 revealed that Blacks were also the
object of this type of violence. Furthermore, out of the 3000 farm attacks that
took place from 1998 to 2001, only 2% appeared to have a racial or political
motive.387 In the words of Johan Burger from the Institute for Security Studies,
―all research so far show[ed] that far more than 90% of these attacks can be
attributed to simple crime—robbery [was] the main motive.‖388 However, a
Human Rights Watch study in 2001 showed that a number of white farmers still
believed the attacks were part of a larger plan by the government to drive them
off their lands.389 With the murder of Terre‘Blanche, these perceptions fed into
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the fears of racial violence. The reactions to the murder from AWB leaders were
also the cause of more concern.
Reactions
The responses to the murder of Terre‘Blanche from some AWB leaders
fed into fears of racial conflict in the country. The event, which was highly
publicized in the local and international media, turned into an opportunity for
AWB leaders to make intimidating statements that contributed to the rising
tension. Andre Visagie, AWB spokesperson, said that the party would seek
ways to ―avenge‖ the death of Terre‘Blanche, a death that he considered to be
―a declaration of war by the Black community of South Africa to the white
community.‖390 Also, the attention of the media gave the new AWB leader Peter
Steyn van Ronge a platform to forward Terre‘Blanche‘s political agenda. In
front of the court where the two murder suspects appeared, Steyn made
comments that echoed Terre‘Blanche‘s secessionist goals: ―All we want is a
piece of land in South Africa where we can settle ourselves and call it our own
and govern ourselves with our religion…and our own laws.‖391 These
comments were made amid the fraught atmosphere that characterized the court
appearance, where police had to set up barbed-wire to separate white and Black
locals as a measure that would deter them from a engaging in a scuffle.392 The
same tense mood was seen at Terre‘Blanche‘s funeral, an event that also
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demanded tight police security.393 Here, AWB followers took the opportunity to
make public their loyalty to the movement by singing the apartheid era national
anthem Die Stem and carrying flags with swastika-like symbols.394 In the same
way, expressions of disenchantment with the government were particularly
focused on Malema. Afrikaner singer Hofmeyr said: ―If you understand the
hate speech of [ANC Youth League president Julius] Malema, you must
understand why I cannot enter a stadium named after Peter ―kill the boer‖
Mokaba.‖395
When put in context, the political ideology of movements like
Terre‘Blanche‘s AWB as well as Malema‘s provocative rhetoric could be taken
as evidence of a lack of fundamental change in some aspects of the political
culture of South Africa. It could be argued that the TRC process, which focused
on a narrow number of human rights violations, could account for an apparent
failure in pending attitudinal elements that can stir up racial divisions. That
white supremacist ideologies are still part of the political fabric of South Africa
is rather unsettling. At the same time, it is equally problematic that Malema, as
a representative of the youth wing of the official party in government, revived a
highly polarizing song from the apartheid era fifteen years after the demise of
the regime. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that movements like the AWB
which have an exclusively segregationist agenda do not garner widespread
support from the population.396 Also, major parties‘ firm condemnation and
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rejection of attitudes that controversial figures like Malema embody
demonstrate that a system of checks and balances is in place, and that racist or
inflammatory comments of any nature are not taken lightly.
At another level, the misleading perceptions that some members of the
Afrikaner community have about farm attacks speak of a prejudicist, racist
mindset that still inform some people‘s judgments. In this respect, James
Gibson‘s claim that the TRC process helped to change images of the ―enemy‖ is
challenged. It could also be said that it is not racism but a lack of information
that fuels these perceptions. Yet, it cannot be assumed that with better
information people would change their views of others just as much as it could
not be asserted that the TRC‘s even-handed approach effectively helped to defy
racial categorizations. Yet, the way the national newspapers framed the murder
show that, in spite of the fact that a prominent white figure was killed by two
black workers, racism may not be necessarily a source of violent conflict.
The Media’s Spotlight on Terre’Blanche
The murder of the AWB leader caught the attention of people in South
Africa and abroad. The fact that it took place only months before the Football
World Cup could have intensified the particular interest of the international
media on the case. At the same time, the framing and the reflection of
international media outlets in comparison to local newspapers‘ approach to the
case was interesting. National newspapers largely focused on the political
figure of Terre‘Blanche and echoed the fears of racial violence. Nevertheless,
none reflected on this event as evidence of failure of the post-apartheid state to
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bridge the racial gaps. The Sunday Times headline read: ―Terre‘Blanche killed:
Hacked to death on his own farm.‖ The lead of the story stressed the violence
that was espoused by the leader and his record as a white supremacist: ―Eugene
Terre‘Blanche‘s violent life came to a brutal end last night…In 1970,
Terre‘Blanche founded the fringe right-wing AWB, and spent three decades
championing white supremacy.‖397 Beeld remarked ―Eugene Terre‘Blanche
killed‖ in its headline, followed by a summary of police allegations on the case.
398

The Mail&Guardian highlighted the role of the farmworkers (―Eugene

Terre‘Blanche killed after row with farmworkers‖) including a lengthy
description of Terre‘Blanche‘s political ideology and history. The lead of the
story was as follows: ―Eugene Terre‘Blanche, who once threatened to wage war
rather than allow black rule in South Africa was hacked to death at his farm on
Saturday following an argument with two employees.‖399 In the days after the
murder, attention shifted to the court appearance of the accused farmers and
the funeral of the AWB leader, but beyond these As these events were taking
place, analyses in the international media establishments were that the murder
showed proof that South Africa continues to be a racially divided country with
potential for racial conflict.
International news outlets delivered the news of the murder and the
aftermath as evidence of ongoing racism in the country. Time magazine‘s
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headline read: ―In South Africa, Murder in Black and White.‖400 The analysis of
CNN mentioned the divisive and racist record of Terre‘Blanche, while it also
refered to South Africans allegedly fearing that the murder could be a sign that
the country, once again, was on the grip of ―racial hatred.‖ 401 The Guardian of
the UK implied that some Afrikaners‘ ―sense of vulnerability‖, born out of fears
that Blacks will take away their lands or that South Africa will become ―another
Zimbabwe‖, impinges on the process of reconciliation that Mandela strove to
establish.402 In its headline, a BBC article emphasized the emotionally charged
event of the murder (―Anger and anxiety after Terre‘Blanche murder‖). Most
prominent, however, was the reference to the likelihood that the murder would
escalate to the point of violent racial conflict. The reference alluded to the
history of the country and the supposedly unchallenged racist attitudes that still
haunt South African society: ―This murder has the power to unleash the
demons of deep-seated racial hatred that have bedeviled this country for three
centuries.‖403 In the extreme side of these types of analyses of the killing, a
column by Andrew Bolt, a co-editor at the Herald Sun (Australia‘s largest
newspaper) announced in its title ―New Racism grips South Africa.‖404 The
author highlighted the alleged indirect role of Malema in the killing, and
warned the following: ―South Africa is sliding back into a new racial divide,
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perhaps even a new apartheid. And this time most of the racists and thugs are
black.‖405 In spite of the negative forecasts about the implications of the murder,
no major violent event materialized in actuality, which is a fact that puts to
question the extent to which racism could be the source of conflict.
What explains the approach of South African newspapers to the murder
could be the perception of the majority that racism would not be the trigger of
conflict. The most prominent newspapers seemed to have paid more interest in
the case because such a contentious figure was involved in it rather than
because it was a murder in ‗black and white‘, as some international media
establishments put it. Although the tension that followed the murder was
identified in the headlines, the newstories did not go beyond that. No grand
debate on the state of race relations in the country emerged, and not much
reference to the possibility of racial conflict breaking out was made. For
purposes of comparison, as the World Cup drew nearer to its finale, threats of
xenophobic violence were captured in the headlines with much more
anticipation than in the case of Terre‘Blanche. Instead, the wage dispute that
could have motivated the killing figured more prominently, as well as the
discussion on Malema‘s possible role in the incident or Terre‘Blanche‘s
ideology. It could be argued that South African newspapers, in contrast to
international media outlets, projected the right image that violent conflict of a
racial nature in South Africa is rather uncontemporary.
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5. Conclusion:
The South African TRC, Media and
Race Relations
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A

ssessing the impact of truth-telling processes in post-conflict
societies is a challenging task. It requires extensive and careful

analysis of all the political and social factors that lead to the implementation of
truth commissions, the capacities that are assigned to these commissions, and
the expectations that people may have in regards to a particular transitional
justice mechanism in order to make fair judgments about their effectiveness.
Even when these elements are taken into consideration, many other factors may
explain the subsequent outcomes of a truth telling-process that escape the range
of assessments. However, in the South African case, as this thesis has shown,
provides a wealth of knowledge and insight from which more can be learned
about the work of a truth commission and the impact it may have had in the
present.
The question with which this research has wrestled specifically is
whether there is relationship between contemporary race relations – a key to
both South African history and the current reality of the country- and the
transitional justice process. The views and critiques about the work of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the media during the
transition to democracy and its effect on the present have been explored. Under
the premise that reconciliation, one of the overarching goals of the TRC, would
by virtue of the legacy of the racism of apartheid signify reconciliation among
previously antagonistic racial groups, this thesis has examined the state of race
relations in South Africa fifteen years after the transition. Two recent events- the
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Reitz Four incident and the murder of AWB leader Eugene Terre‘Blanche- have
served as case studies for this analysis. The nature of the debate that these
events ensued, the larger issues that they brought up and the way the print
media portrayed them, have offered ways to understand the hypothesis that
has prompted this research.
The preliminary hypothesis that has motivated this research is
confirmed. The hypothesis that is stated in Chapter 1 reads as follows:
―[…] the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), directed by the
Parliamentary Act that established it, failed to properly integrate a
discussion of race and racism into its work. Particularly, that the conflict
came to be understood in terms of victims of a small scope of human
rights violations and perpetrators of those violations posed certain
limitations on reconciliation. In the same manner, the way in which the
media reported the TRC process only added to a lack of structural
analysis about apartheid. Although extensive, the media limited its work
to covering the TRC hearings without subjecting the content of the
information they gathered to deeper criticism. Hence, by ignoring the
context of the events described and discussed in the Commission, the
media deepened the analysis gap of the transitional justice process.
Ultimately, the TRC and the media‘s downplay of race as the explanatory
variable for the violations that occurred during apartheid may have
contributed to race relations that remain problematic in contemporary
South Africa.‖406
Certainly, the findings of the case studies demonstrate that there are ongoing
issues of racism in South Africa which can be correlated to the TRC and the
media‘s work. Causation is less easy to determine, however. How exactly the
process of the TRC, with the intervention of the print media that reflected this
process and delivered it to larger society, could account for the number of
issues that came up in the case studies that have been explored in this research
is a question that could only be answered by drawing tentative connections.
406
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Recognition of the fact that the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act no. 34, which established the TRC, delineated fundamental
aspects of the scope of the Commission‘s work is imperative as well. It is
important to acknowledge that at some levels, criticism of procedures or
terminology of the TRC would be better directed at the Parliamentary Act
which created the Commission. This means that, although the focus of this
research is on race relations as a function of the TRC, a number of conditions of
the truth-telling process that are the object of debate in this analysis, such as the
terms ‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘, were pre-defined in the Act.407 Nevertheless,
although the Commission was circumscribed by the terms of the Act that
established it, it could have still done much more than what it actually did to
avoid the exclusion of a much needed structural analysis of apartheid. The
same can be said about the media. The close examination of the two case studies
of this research offer insights into how contemporary race relations in South
Africa bear the effect of some aspects of the transitional justice process.
Features of the racist legacy of apartheid still remain in place in South
Africa in ways that can support some of the criticism that has been made about
the TRC process and what it actually delivered in terms of racial reconciliation.
Some of the problematic aspects that came up in the case studies paint a rather
fragmented picture of a post-apartheid, ‗post-TRC‘ South Africa which should
have ideally overcome the main source of antagonisms of the past-in particular,
race. Following the argument of Madeleine Fullard and Nahla Valji in regards
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to the ‗displacement of racism‘ from accounts of the TRC, and Anthea Garman‘s
criticism of the media in general for having downplayed the explanatory value
of racism for understanding the human rights violations of the past, the cases
studies have shown that in fact the racist ideology that underpin the structural
establishment of apartheid remains unchallenged at some levels. The degree of
institutional segregation at the University of the Free State (UFS), the rejection
of integration policies on the part of Afrikaner students, the salience of
Afrikaner nationalism to justify segregationist political platforms, the role of
leaders like the ANC Youth League President Julius Malema or Eugene
Terre‘Blanche in mobilizing constituencies by inciting racial divisions and racial
prejudices, and the level of mistrust and misunderstanding in the Afrikaner
community in regards to ‗farm attacks‘ are issues that question the extent to
which South Africans-particularly Afrikaners- are racially reconciled.
The fact that many of the issues at UFS as well as at other institutions of
higher education were born out of ongoing racism validates criticism of the
TRC process. This fact underpins Valji‘s argument: ―The TRC has left many of
the structures of inequality intact and unaddressed and has suppressed
dialogue on the persistence of racism in the new South Africa.‖ 408 The
institutional issues at UFS also support Fullard‘s assertion that the TRC‘s
institutional hearings could not have done more for reconciliation because they
were not the main focus of the process, but rather an ‗awkward‘ discontinuity
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from the common procedures of the TRC.409 Hence, it could be said that a more
ample discussion during the TRC process on the role of racism at the
institutional level in apartheid could have undermined the racist foundations of
establishments like the UFS.
The largely negative reactions to the Vice-chancellor‘s decision, reflected
in the most prominent newspapers of the country, could be the result of the sole
focus of the TRC and the media on victims and perpetrators and a set number
of human rights violations to the exclusion of a more structural analysis. Had
the TRC, and the media, approached the apartheid‘s past from a more
comprehensive angle (i.e. more regard to institutions, laws, and ideologies),
more people could have felt part of the process and hence, express more
supportive views towards the Vice-chancellor‘s decision of foregoing
punishment and engaging in a conciliatory path. As Mamdani has argued, the
narrow approach of the TRC had the effect of disengaging a large portion of the
population who were victims as well as those who were apartheid‘s
‗beneficiaries‘, thereby impinging on reconciliation.410 The exclusion of the
theme of how racism affected the whole of society from the accounts of the
Commission that Valji describes, and in the media‘s framing of the stories that
covered the hearings which the MMG report has pointed at, could be reflecting
itself in partial, individualized understandings of racist acts today in South
Africa.
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Both case studies show that there are still ideologies and political actors
which promote attitudes from the past that exacerbate racial tensions.
Inflammatory political platforms and rhetoric have a degree of influence in
certain sectors of society in South Africa. The Afrikaner nationalism of political
parties like the FF+ and AWB stirs racist sentiments and segregationist
aspirations in their Afrikaner constituencies. Strategically, the FF+ and the AWB
target audiences who feel vulnerable in a multiracial society that no longer
guarantees the unfair privileges they used to have in the past. Their political
demands are based on the same type of ideas that motivated apartheid era
leaders to implement their racist laws. When these factors are taken into
consideration, an essentially ‗Afrikaner‘ problem seems to emerge. A sense of
not belonging in the new, multiracial South Africa appears to exist among some
sectors of the Afrikaner population that denotes a lack of reconciliation from
their side. Figures like Julius Malema would want to revive the memory of the
struggle against apartheid, in detriment of racial reconciliation, in order to
downplay the failure of the ANC ruling to deliver to a yet largely
disenfranchised Black majority.
Criticism of the TRC for having failed to reveal and condemn the racism
behind the ‗politically motivated acts‘ that it explored finds some ground in the
present when looking at the ideologies and attitudes of the political actors
which are mentioned above. In lights of this, Valji‘s assertion that the TRC‘s
‗political‘ label of human rights violations committed in the past disguised the
racism that motivated those violations and ruled out a proper discussion and
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condemnation of racism as such gains force.411 The platform of the FF+, Eugene
Terre‘Blanche‘s AWB, and the comments of Julius Malema incite racism and
racial conflict behind a political façade. These are elements that attack the
‗rainbow nation‘ that Mandela envisioned. They foster the vilification of others
and weaken integration efforts. They are a negation to the goals of ‗national
unity and reconciliation‘ that the TRC aspired. They exploit people‘s fear and
exacerbate their prejudices which lead up to racist acts such as the Reitz Four.
In the same way that torture, killing and persecution could only have taken
place in the past in an environment conducive to racism, these political parties
and actors seek to enforce racial identities in order to advance particularly
divisive agendas that could only bring back the past. Can the work of the TRC
explain the continuity of these attitudes? Certainly, the TRC did not directly
reject these types of attitudes. It condemned a number of human rights
violations, but it did not hold perpetrators to account for the racism that
motivated their actions and informed their political ideologies. This could have
been the product of the even-handedness that the Commission embraced when
assessing the violations. Had it not aspired to stay neutral in regards to human
rights violations, a debate on the role of racism could have been initiated and
extended.
At the same time, although the Reitz Four incident and the Terre‘Blanche
killing highlight the racist attitudes at the individual and group levels, it would
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be unfair to make a generalization about the whole of society from these
samples. It has to be noted that Terre‘Blanche and Malema fall toward the
extreme of the political spectrum in South Africa. Terre‘Blanche did not have
much prominence in the years after 1994, and Malema is a contemporary
political figure who is better known for his controversial remarks and
extravagant lifestyle rather than for enjoying wide support across the
population. Furthermore, major parties swiftly condemned the role of political
ideology in both incidents, which is a sign of a political culture that is
increasingly more intolerant towards racism. At the same time, the larger issues
that came to the forefront of the public discussion on the newspapers indicate
that a lack of racial reconciliation is at work, which could be a result of the
TRC‘s ‗de-racialization‘ of the past, as Fullard argues. Afrikaner farmers who
hold onto the prejudicial belief that farm attacks are an attack on their race,
groups of students who are opposed to racial integration, and young political
leaders who rally support by using symbols from a time of violent conflict
reveal the need for further progress in terms of racial reconciliation.
While conjectures of a lack of racial reconciliation –a lack that can be
related to the omission of a more assertive discussion on the role of racism
during truth telling process- are valid, it is also worth nothing that the response
to the challenges that racism posed in these cases studies speak of measure of
progress that could also be attributed to a precedent set by the TRC. For
instance, in spite of the bad press regarding the decision of the UFS Vicechancellor to drop the charges against the Reitz Four incident, the logic that
154

formed the basis of his decision resembles the ideological and moral
foundations of restorative justice mechanisms which is consistent with the
TRC‘s approach. Also, the fact that no major violent racial event materialized in
the aftermath of the murder of Terre‘Blanche supports claims that racism is not
a main catalyst for violent conflict.
The restorative justice approach of the new Vice-chancellor of UFS not
only shows signs of a positive post-TRC legacy, but is in fact the continuation of
the process that the Commission sought to initiate. The vice-chancellor‘s
position mirrors the TRC and other truth commissions foundations effectively:
that it would take much more than trials and prosecutions to change the whole
establishment of apartheid, and that any fractured society that aims to
transform itself and move on from the past, as Alex Boraine has said, cannot
count on punishment to restore the broken social fabric. The fact that it was the
first Black Vice-chancellor who apologized for the failures of his white
predecessors to dismantle the racism that haunted UFS for decades puts him on
the level of moral icons such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. The Vicechancellor knew that given the historical record of the University and the
number of larger racial issues that continued to affect the institution,
punishment of the four Afrikaner students who attacked the dignity of the five
Black workers would not end the racism that permeated the very structures of
the university. Therefore, in the same way that the TRC took up the task of
providing amnesty to the perpetrators of apartheid and acknowledging the
victims as the first stepping stones in the direction of reconciliation, the Vice155

chancellor sought to initiate his plan of transforming the university‘s culture by
acknowledging that punishment would not set the right tone to fight against
institutional racism. Both the TRC and the Vice-Chancellor attempted to bring
together the people who would have to bear and drive forward the larger
changes that need to take place.
Another positive development illustrated in the case studies is that in
spite of expectations that the murder of Terre‘Blanche would ignite racial
violence in the country, the largely peaceful response of the public proves that
racism is not necessarily a factor that could lead to the escalation of violent
conflict, as some studies have shown as well. Thus, it could also be argued that
the TRC language of ‗victims and perpetrators‘ that Mamdani and Fullard
criticize did change people‘s perceptions of each other, as Gibson has argued,
and might account for the fewer number of events in which another person‘s
race is the sole catalyst for violence in South Africa. The fact that no major
events of racial violence materialized in the aftermath of Terre‘Blanche‘s killing
represents a step forward in the dynamics of race relations in the country that
could be taken as a measure of reconciliation, thus a correlation with the work
of the TRC. A more relevant causal factor of violence, as statistics show, is class
and not race, as was the case during apartheid. Furthermore, the absence of
racial violence in this particular case also shows that the misleading claims and
demands of the AWB or the FF+do not resonate with the greater bulk of society.
Nevertheless, South Africa is still characterized by its high levels of violence.
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This is a phenomenon that poses a great threat to the need to move away from
the violent past.
The case studies have shown that newspapers have at times framed
racial issues better today than during the TRC process. At other times, however,
they have failed to stress important aspects of events related to these incidents.
In the Reitz Four case, newspapers of varied readership highlighted the
wrongness of the acts perpetrated in the video. However, most newspapers
largely concentrated on the few individuals involved in this particular case.
This type of approach is precisely the one that critics saw as problematic during
the TRC process. In delivering the findings of the hearings of the Commission
to wider society, newspapers and other media outlets also simplified the
conflict of the past by only highlighting the role of high profile perpetrators and
a small number of victims. The negative portrayal of the Vice-chancellor‘s
decision in the headlines of major newspapers, without regard to what his
decision actually entailed, reflects a failure of not delving into a deeper
understanding of the ‗institutional complicity‘ that the Vice-chancellor had
referred to. In the present like in the past, most newspapers failed to address
the bigger issues that were at work at UFS. As a result, it could be argued that a
chance to initiate a public debate on the way racism impacts society was missed
again.
The more nuanced approach to the murder of Terre‘Blanche by local
newspapers is a positive aspect of print-media‘s current analysis of racial
events. This approach also reinforces the argument that racism is no longer a
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predictor of violence in South Africa. The framing of content in South African
print media analyzed in this research has shown that they had a much better
understanding of racial dynamics in the country than international media
outlets. The predictions of imminent racial violence that major newspapers
around the world made stood in sharp contrast to the focus of national
newspapers on the minor relevance that Terre‘Blanche and his ideology
enjoyed in the new South Africa.
As part of the literature that assesses the work of truth commissions and
the media in transitional justice processes, this thesis adds a qualitative analysis
of one truth-telling process in particular that can serve as a guide for analysis of
other experiences. The thesis exposes the complexity of measuring success or
impact of a truth-telling process, but does not deny the possibility of drawing
connections between contemporary events and justice efforts of the past. The
inductive methodology that this thesis has relied on complements other
research works that make use of quantitative tools. The methodology has
revealed that some correlations can be established between the TRC, the media
and racial reconciliation in South Africa.
Causation is harder to prove with the case studies examined in this
research. At the same time, this limitation opens up the opportunity for further
research. For instance, more contemporary case studies could reveal more
connections with the TRC process. Also, analysis of the framing of media
outlets other than newspapers could add to the depth of any research.
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of a truth commission that did or may
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explicitly address racism in its work and the outcome of such an approach
could show what other factors explain the development of racial relations in a
post-conflict society.
Certainly, this thesis could not have addressed all the elements that
shape and define the state of race relations in South Africa today. In the same
manner, the TRC and the media could only have done so much to establish a
clean break from the past. Furthermore, in a now democratic South Africa, as
this thesis has shown, even strong racial identities that have their origins in the
long history of segregation of the country might not determine the outcomes of
some incidents. However, the assessment of past efforts of redefining the
attitudes and the ways people relate to each other show that there are
opportunities for improvement. In South Africa, when apartheid affected such a
large number of people in such varied ways, the truth-telling process could
have been more inclusive and more critical of the establishments that sustained
the racist regime. In this context, the media could have helped to shed light over
those areas where the Commission could not reach. They could have held the
people and the institutions that did not fall under the purview of the work of
the TRC more accountable. The positive aspect of this reflection is that today,
much more can still be done to rectify any shortcomings of the transitional
justice process. When the sources of conflict of the past such as racism take the
forefront of the national debate, the opportunity to initiate another round of
efforts to move away from the past should not be missed.
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